<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?><feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" ><generator uri="https://jekyllrb.com/" version="4.4.1">Jekyll</generator><link href="https://nesbitt.io/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" /><link href="https://nesbitt.io/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" /><updated>2026-11-10T17:32:56+00:00</updated><id>https://nesbitt.io/feed.xml</id><title type="html">Andrew Nesbitt</title><subtitle>Package management and open source metadata expert. Building Ecosyste.ms, open datasets and tools for critical open source infrastructure.</subtitle><author><name>Andrew Nesbitt</name><email>andrew@ecosyste.ms</email></author><entry><title type="html">Introducing Ninety</title><link href="https://nesbitt.io/2026/11/09/introducing-ninety.html" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Introducing Ninety" /><published>2026-11-09T12:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2026-11-09T12:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://nesbitt.io/2026/11/09/introducing-ninety</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://nesbitt.io/2026/11/09/introducing-ninety.html"><![CDATA[<p>We’re excited to announce Ninety, the first prediction market for open source security, launching today in partnership with Lanternfish, the frontier AI lab for software security. Security report volumes at major projects are <a href="https://daniel.haxx.se/blog/2026/05/26/the-pressure/">four to five times higher than in 2024</a>. Attackers and defenders are both running frontier models against the same few thousand packages, and everything those models turn up is scattered across disclosure inboxes, private chats, embargo lists and exploit brokers, with no price attached.</p>

<p>Ninety puts a price on it. Anyone can take a position on whether an open source project will have a vulnerability disclosed, how severe it will be, and how long the fix will take. Researchers earn from the markets they called correctly, and defenders who harden code earn when contracts resolve NO. Everyone who depends on open source gets a per-project price for how secure their dependencies are, updated every second.</p>

<h3 id="rationale">Rationale</h3>

<p>Bug bounties make one payment to whoever finds a bug, after the report is in. Grant programs fund a handful of projects a year after a long application process. Both fall behind when a single model run can produce forty plausible reports before lunch, and this year several bounties closed. curl <a href="https://daniel.haxx.se/blog/2026/01/26/the-end-of-the-curl-bug-bounty/">ended its bug bounty</a> in January and Google <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2026/10/04/google-froze-its-open-source-bug-bounty-program-due-to-a-significant-rise-in-ai-submissions/">paused its open source VRP</a> in October, citing “a significant rise in automated submissions, the vast majority of which are not valid.” HackerOne’s Internet Bug Bounty <a href="https://www.theregister.com/security/2026/05/21/hackerone-takes-an-axe-to-its-bug-bounty-rewards/5244458">paused new submissions and cut its medium-severity payout from $1,843 to $297</a>. Ninety replaces the submission queue with an order book, and every new report moves the price.</p>

<p>Writing about curl’s bug bounty in 2024, Daniel Stenberg called it <a href="https://daniel.haxx.se/blog/2024/10/09/curl-bug-bounty-stats/">“an absolute and undisputed success”</a>. Ninety takes the same incentive and makes it continuous and open to anyone with a verified account.</p>

<h3 id="mechanics">Mechanics</h3>

<p>Each market is a binary contract on a single project over a fixed window. The standard term is ninety days, matching the industry disclosure deadline and giving Ninety its name. Contracts trade between $0 and $1, and the price is the traders’ current estimate of the probability that the event happens. Launch markets include:</p>

<ul>
  <li>curl: Will a CVE rated High or Critical be published before 31 January 2027?</li>
  <li>OpenSSL: Will the next major release ship before the next High-severity advisory?</li>
  <li>Linux: Over/under on kernel CVEs published in December, line set by Lanternfish.</li>
  <li>lodash: Will the maintainers respond to the next security report within 14 days?</li>
  <li>PHP: Will a follow-up fix for php2shell be needed before 1 February 2027?</li>
</ul>

<p>Every listed project also has a set of standard side markets: days-to-patch, whether a fix gets backported to older release lines, whether the advisory gets a name and a logo, and whether the repository is archived or its sole maintainer steps down before expiry.</p>

<p>Contracts can be chained into parlays, which pay out when every leg resolves YES, with odds set by Lanternfish. A dependency parlay has a leg for each step of a fix through the graph, such as a High-severity advisory in zlib followed by a CVE for each listed project that vendors it. The most popular parlay in beta was the Long Weekend, with legs for a Critical CVE published on a Friday, the first fix released after Monday, and the sole maintainer stepping down within the contract window.</p>

<h3 id="results">Results</h3>

<p>Ninety has been in private beta with a few hundred traders since the summer. The PHP “CVSS 9+ before Halloween” contract traded at four cents for most of September. It closed at 97 cents on the afternoon of 20 October, the day before PHP shipped fixes for <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/10/21/critical-vulnerabilities-php-require-immediate-patching">CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619</a>, and CISA’s addition of both to the KEV catalog on 26 October settled the follow-on exploitation contract. Congratulations to whoever was buying in September.</p>

<p>Our most traded contract of the year is the exploit count over/under on <a href="https://www.vulncheck.com/blog/routinely-targeted-vulnerabilities-may-2026">Copy Fail</a>, the Linux kernel privilege escalation found with AI assistance in April. It resolved at 132 public proofs of concept.</p>

<p>Backtested against historical data, the 2024 xz-utils backdoor would have been the most profitable position in open source history. The account best placed to take it had commit access to the project and would have been barred under our insider rules.</p>

<p>“I used to send reports to maintainers and wait months for a reply,” said Max Tokens, the top-earning YES trader in the beta. “These days I buy YES on the project first and then file the report.”</p>

<p>“We run Lanternfish against every project we hold NO on, and the returns cover the compute,” said Ram Hoarder, who leads a four-person defensive trading desk on the NO side. “Patches go into our fork until the contract expires, which protects the position.”</p>

<h3 id="lanternfish">Lanternfish</h3>

<p>Ninety is sponsored by Lanternfish, whose models are used by most of the researchers who find open source vulnerabilities and most of the teams who fix them. Every verified trader gets Lanternfish credits on signup. Lanternfish is Ninety’s designated market maker and provides liquidity on both sides of every contract. On the Copy Fail over/under it made the market on both sides while traders using its models generated most of the 132 proofs of concept being counted. Each of those model runs counted toward the Security Investment Score of the trader who ran it, which tracks Lanternfish usage and is shown on their public profile next to their returns.</p>

<p>“Security in 2026 is a compute problem,” said Chip Shortage, CEO of Lanternfish. “Attackers are using frontier models to find bugs, so defenders have to use them too, and Ninety pays both sides back for the compute.”</p>

<h3 id="integrity">Integrity</h3>

<p>Ninety has strict insider rules to keep prices fair. Trading on a project is blocked for anyone with commit, release or publish access to it, anyone named in its maintainers file, code owners or security policy, and anyone who received an embargoed report about it in the last twelve months. We match identities against commit history, registry ownership records and signing keys automatically, so maintainers are excluded without signing up. “Maintainers are excluded the day their project is listed,” said Chuck Sum, Ninety’s Head of Market Integrity. “Most of them have no idea Ninety exists, which is exactly what you want from an insider control.”</p>

<p>A trader who opens a pull request against a listed project becomes an insider for that project when the pull request is opened, and their positions are closed at the current price. Most traders hold fixes in a private fork until their contracts expire.</p>

<p>Maintainers know more about their own projects than anyone else, so they’re the one group permanently excluded. We expect most of them to be fine with that. As Daniel Stenberg wrote earlier this year, <a href="https://daniel.haxx.se/blog/2026/05/26/the-pressure/">“I am not in this game for the money or the extravagant life style.”</a></p>

<p>Traders may research the projects they hold positions in, including submitting security reports, requesting CVEs, opening issues, and asking for status updates on existing reports. Any contact with a maintainer intended to influence a market outcome must be disclosed on the trader’s profile within 24 hours.</p>

<p>Markets resolve when any CNA publishes a CVE record for the project, and resolution is based on publication alone. Records that are later disputed or rejected still resolve YES if they were published inside the contract window.</p>

<h3 id="listing">Listing</h3>

<p>Any project with a package on a major registry and at least one CVE in its history is listed automatically. Ninety lists projects without asking their maintainers, because the security of widely used software is a matter of public interest and the markets reflect information that already exists.</p>

<p>Maintainers can request delisting from any market page. A delisting request is material non-public information about the project, so it’s disclosed to traders as soon as it’s received and marked on the price chart. Archiving a repository settles that project’s abandonment markets, and its other markets run to expiry.</p>

<p>0.1% of all trading fees go into the Maintainer Appreciation Pool, paid out quarterly to the maintainers of listed projects as Lanternfish credits, with the largest shares going to projects whose markets resolve NO most often. Credits can be spent on Lanternfish’s report triage models. Each listed project also gets one complimentary read-only dashboard seat, and maintainers can apply for delayed market data on their own projects, released ninety days after each contract settles.</p>

<h3 id="organisations">Organisations</h3>

<p>Teams can buy YES across their dependency tree as a hedge, so a critical CVE in a transitive dependency pays out when your exposure is highest, and for most organisations a hedged dependency tree costs less than a support contract. “We moved our open source sponsorship budget into a YES position across our whole dependency tree,” said Audrey Trail, CISO at a Fortune 100 retailer. “It’s paid out four times this year.”</p>

<p>Upload an SPDX or CycloneDX SBOM and Ninety builds the hedge for you. Each listed component gets its own YES contract. Teams now have a financial reason to update the SBOM whenever a dependency changes.</p>

<p>Since 11 September, manufacturers selling into the EU have had to <a href="https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/cra-reporting">report actively exploited vulnerabilities</a> under the Cyber Resilience Act. The early warning is due within 24 hours. Ninety’s CRA hedge adds an exploitation contract for every component in your SBOM. Each position is sized to the Act’s maximum fine: €15 million or 2.5% of worldwide turnover, whichever is higher. When one of your dependencies is exploited, the payout arrives before your early warning is due.</p>

<p>The Ninety price feed is available to software composition analysis vendors as a per-package security signal, and procurement teams can set a minimum NO price for any dependency entering their software.</p>

<h3 id="availability">Availability</h3>

<p>Ninety is live today in 41 jurisdictions. Sign up, verify your identity, and connect a Lanternfish key. Your first ten trades are free. Know the odds.</p>

<p>If you maintain a listed project, thank you for creating value for the Ninety ecosystem.</p>

<p><em>Editor’s note: This is satire, not a product spec. Please don’t build it. <a href="/2025/12/27/how-to-ruin-all-of-package-management">How to Ruin All of Package Management</a> covers what happens when markets get attached to open source metrics. If you have money for open source security, give it to the projects. Daniel Stenberg’s <a href="https://daniel.haxx.se/blog/2026/05/26/the-pressure/">The pressure</a> describes the current volume of reports from the receiving end.</em></p>]]></content><author><name>Andrew Nesbitt</name><email>andrew@ecosyste.ms</email></author><category term="security" /><category term="maintainers" /><category term="satire" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[Now trading: curl, OpenSSL, lodash and PHP]]></summary><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://nesbitt.io/images/boxes.png" /><media:content medium="image" url="https://nesbitt.io/images/boxes.png" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" /></entry><entry><title type="html">This Week in Package Management: 7 November 2026</title><link href="https://nesbitt.io/2026/11/07/this-week-in-package-management.html" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="This Week in Package Management: 7 November 2026" /><published>2026-11-07T10:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2026-11-07T10:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://nesbitt.io/2026/11/07/this-week-in-package-management</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://nesbitt.io/2026/11/07/this-week-in-package-management.html"><![CDATA[<p>This week’s package management news, gathered from the <a href="https://github.com/ecosyste-ms/package-managers-opml">package manager OPML feed collection</a>, my posts and boosts on <a href="https://mastodon.social/@andrewnez">Mastodon</a>, and anything people sent me. Version control and forge news is in the Wednesday <a href="/2026/11/04/this-week-in-source-control.html">This Week in Source Control</a> roundup.</p>

<h2 id="security">Security</h2>

<p><a href="https://voxpupuli.org/blog/2026/11/03/critical-cve-updates/">Vox Pupuli fixed three critical vulnerabilities</a> that a Neodyme researcher reported in OpenVox, the community fork of Puppet. OpenVox Server deserialised Ruby objects embedded in agent run reports, which allowed remote code execution. The shared Trapperkeeper authorisation library matched every plain-string rule in <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">auth.conf</code> as a wildcard, so a certificate for <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">evil.target.example.com</code> was accepted as <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">target.example.com</code>. The OpenVoxDB container image allowed any certificate to reach its API because its allowlist script failed on startup.</p>

<p>All known Puppet implementations are affected, and the fixes are in openvox-agent 8.32.0 and 9.3.0 and openvox-server and openvoxdb 8.18.0 and 9.2.0. Updates to open source Puppet, including security fixes, have ended, so Vox Pupuli recommends migrating to OpenVox.</p>

<p>An <a href="https://github.com/actions/runner-images/issues/15228">issue on actions/runner-images</a> reports that GitHub’s public macOS runners still accept certificates from the compromised eMudhra intermediates covered here last week. Apple has yet to patch the system <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">/etc/ssl/cert.pem</code>. Homebrew has shipped patched <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">ca-certificates</code>, <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">curl</code> and <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">git</code>, but the runner images disable Homebrew updates, so jobs run the vulnerable preinstalled versions.</p>

<p><a href="https://lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce/2026/msg00526.html">DSA-6607-1</a> fixes <a href="https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-109518">CVE-2026-109518</a> in APT, found by Max Justicz. When an HTTP redirect gave two package downloads the same URI, APT could merge them. A retried download then let an attacker on the network path, including a malicious mirror or proxy, replace a package after verification and run code as root.</p>

<p>The attack needs <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">Acquire::Retries</code> set to 1 or higher, and the default is 3 from Debian 12 and Ubuntu 22.04. Fixed versions are 3.0.4 for trixie, 2.6.2 for bookworm and 3.3.6 in unstable.</p>

<p>A <a href="https://discourse.nixos.org/t/security-advisory-darwin-linux-builder-leaks-its-ssh-private-key-into-the-nix-store-and-exposes-its-ssh-port-to-the-network/81001">Nixpkgs advisory</a> covers two bugs in <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">darwin.linux-builder</code>, the Linux VM that macOS users run as a remote builder. The <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">run-builder</code> script added the whole <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">keys</code> directory to the world-readable Nix store, so any local user could log in as <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">builder</code>, a trusted user on the VM’s Nix daemon (<a href="https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/security/advisories/GHSA-45qr-47fw-2p57">GHSA-45qr-47fw-2p57</a>).</p>

<p>The QEMU variants also forwarded the builder’s SSH port on every network interface (<a href="https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/security/advisories/GHSA-w5j5-2jpq-3cv3">GHSA-w5j5-2jpq-3cv3</a>). Fixes are on unstable and 26.05, and after updating the advisory says to delete the old key pair from the store, regenerate it and delete the builder’s disk image.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.com/moby/moby/releases/tag/docker-v29.9.3">Docker Engine 29.9.3</a> fixes four CVEs in the engine and SwarmKit. It also updates to BuildKit 0.34.2, which fixes a resolver cache poisoning crash when a build resolves the same Git source twice.</p>

<h2 id="releases">Releases</h2>

<p>hex.pm <a href="https://hex.pm/blog/announcing-workload-identity-and-staged-publishing">opened Workload Identity and staged publishing</a> to every package and organisation. A GitHub Actions job can exchange its OIDC token for a Workload Identity token that expires after 15 minutes and can publish only that package. An organisation can also use a read identity to fetch its private packages in CI with only the job’s OIDC token. Staged publishing holds releases published with a key or a workload identity until a person approves them with a fresh 2FA code.</p>

<p>New packages get staging by default and existing packages have to opt in. Staged releases expire after seven days. <a href="https://github.com/hexpm/hex/releases/tag/v2.7.0">Hex 2.7.0</a> adds <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">mix hex.publish --wait</code>, which blocks until the release is approved and exits with an error if it is rejected or expires. A new <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">--check-unused-ignores</code> flag makes <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">mix hex.audit</code> fail on ignore entries that match nothing in <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">mix.lock</code>.</p>

<p>PyPI’s <a href="https://blog.pypi.org/posts/2026-11-06-ui-updates-complete/">redesigned project pages</a> add a Security tab that shows each release’s provenance and the attestations for each file. A release counts as having full provenance only when every file has a Trusted Publisher or SLSA build attestation. Warnings flag incomplete, inconsistent, changed or lost provenance, and files uploaded more than 14 days after an older release get a late-upload marker.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.com/conda/conda/releases/tag/26.10.0">conda 26.10.0</a> makes <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">conda-rattler-solver</code> the default solver, including after upgrades where the solver setting is unset. <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">--solver=libmamba</code> selects the libmamba solver, and the classic pycosat solver now ships in a bundled <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">conda-pycosat-solver</code> plugin. The release also records when an environment was last activated and adds <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">--disable-plugins</code> and <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">--enable-plugins</code> for switching individual plugins off and on.</p>

<p><a href="https://pnpm.io/blog/releases/12.18.0">pnpm 12.18.0</a> publishes platform variants of a package to pnpr registries as one archive per target, and installs the variant that fits the host. Publishing to any other registry requires <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">--no-variants</code>, which publishes only the archive that targets any platform. Agent skills are now approved one skill at a time and linked under their own names. <a href="https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/pnpr%400.1.0-alpha.18">pnpr 0.1.0-alpha.18</a> stores hosted package metadata in SQLite or libSQL and logs release records in transparency logs.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.com/jdx/mise/releases/tag/v2026.11.0">mise 2026.11.0</a> (now <a href="https://github.com/jdx/mise/releases/tag/v2026.11.3">2026.11.3</a>) makes <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">--locked</code> require checksums, and safe mode now ignores project lockfiles. It adds opt-in Sigstore provenance verification for <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">npm:</code> tools, which checks only the tool’s own package and requires the embedded aube package manager. Tasks can now declare a <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">lock</code> so that runs sharing a database or simulator execute one at a time, even across worktrees.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.com/prefix-dev/pixi/releases/tag/v0.84.0">pixi 0.84.0</a> (now <a href="https://github.com/prefix-dev/pixi/releases/tag/v0.84.1">0.84.1</a>) moves <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">exclude-newer</code> into the <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">[workspace]</code> table and supports exemptions to the cutoff. A workspace can apply the cutoff to new releases by default and exempt vetted security releases. A rattler fix for hash collisions between unequal package versions means lockfiles written by older pixi versions may require a <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">pixi lock</code> before pixi accepts them as locked.</p>

<p><a href="https://pip.pypa.io/en/stable/news/#v26-3">pip 26.3</a> blocks unexpected imports during installation and warns about unsafe ones afterwards. HTTP redirects to <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">file:</code> URLs are now rejected, and PyPI’s restriction on direct URL dependencies now covers extras and cached wheels. <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">-r pylock.toml</code> now supports extras and non-default dependency groups, and accepts <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">--no-binary</code>. The security policy now states that installing untrusted wheels has always been unsafe, since Python’s import system can run third-party code during installation.</p>

<p><a href="https://docs.gradle.org/9.9.0/release-notes.html">Gradle 9.9.0</a> promotes the custom <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">dependencies</code> block API out of incubation, including bundles and constraints from providers. When the <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">wrapper</code> task regenerates <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">gradle-wrapper.properties</code>, it now carries over existing settings such as distribution type, timeouts and retries. It still regenerates <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">distributionUrl</code>, which overwrites a custom host.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.com/zizmorcore/zizmor/releases/tag/v1.32.0">zizmor 1.32.0</a> adds experimental support for GitHub’s new <a href="https://docs.zizmor.sh/usage/#workflow-lockfiles">workflow lockfiles</a>. It now collects only the inputs GitHub Actions reads, so it skips workflows in vendored directories.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/releases/tag/44.222.0">Renovate 44.210.0 to 44.222.0</a> adds a <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">julia</code> manager with a datasource for the General registry and Julia versioning, and reads transitive dependencies from <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">uv.lock</code> for security updates. Extracted constraints are now shared across managers. A tool version pinned in mise or <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">rust-toolchain</code> limits the updates other managers open.</p>

<p>Dependabot version updates <a href="https://github.blog/changelog/2026-11-03-dependabot-version-updates-support-agent-package-manager/">now support Microsoft’s Agent Package Manager</a> on github.com, following the <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">apm</code> ecosystem added in Dependabot Core 0.400.0. It opens pull requests for git dependencies declared in <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">apm.yml</code> and regenerates <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">apm.lock.yaml</code> when present. The support covers version updates only.</p>

<p>Also out:</p>

<ul>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/astral-sh/uv/releases/tag/0.13.7">uv 0.13.7</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://pnpm.io/blog/releases/11.28.11">pnpm 11.28.11</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://vlt.io/blog/vlt-1-6-4">vlt 1.6.4</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/npm/cli/releases/tag/v12.2.2">npm 12.2.2</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://blog.rubygems.org/2026/11/05/4.0.24-released.html">RubyGems 4.0.24</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/Homebrew/brew/releases/tag/7.0.12">Homebrew 7.0.12</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://blog.rust-lang.org/2026/11/03/Rustup-1.29.3/">rustup 1.29.3</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://ziglang.org/news/0.17.1-released/">Zig 0.17.1</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/pypa/pipx/releases/tag/1.18.16">pipx 1.18.16</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/pdm-project/pdm/releases/tag/2.29.7">PDM 2.29.7</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://salsa.debian.org/apt-team/apt/-/tags/3.3.7">APT 3.3.7</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/rpm-software-management/dnf5/releases/tag/5.4.7.0">DNF5 5.4.7.0</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/opentofu/opentofu/releases/tag/v1.13.9">OpenTofu 1.13.9</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/elm/compiler/releases/tag/0.19.4-beta">Elm 0.19.4-beta</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/dependabot/dependabot-core/releases/tag/v0.403.0">Dependabot Core 0.403.0</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/NuGet/NuGet.Client/releases/tag/8.2.0.6">NuGet Client 8.2.0.6</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/sbt/sbt/releases/tag/v2.1.0-RC3">sbt 2.1.0-RC3</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/releases/tag/v2.16.0-rc2">Harbor 2.16.0-rc2</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/moby/moby/releases/tag/docker-v29.10.0-rc.1">Docker Engine 29.10.0-rc.1</a></li>
</ul>

<h2 id="articles">Articles</h2>

<p><a href="https://blog.schuetze.link/friction-in-packaging-peps/">Friction in the Python Packaging Standards Process</a> (konsti, uv) lists problems with how packaging PEPs get made. The text goes through editing passes before and after discussion and moves between reStructuredText and Markdown. Discussions on discuss.python.org have no concern tracking, and several maintainers avoid the forum. Small changes, such as removing a decade-old unimplemented feature, require a full PEP. The post points to Rust’s RFC concern tracking and final comment period as prior art.</p>

<p><a href="https://daniel.haxx.se/blog/2026/11/03/scrutinize-our-assessments/">Scrutinize our assessments</a> (Daniel Stenberg) follows up on curl moving low and medium severity vulnerability handling into public GitHub issues. Stenberg explains the <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">vuln:ASSESS</code>, <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">vuln:NONE</code>, <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">vuln:LOW</code> and <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">vuln:MEDIUM</code> labels and asks outsiders to challenge the severity calls. CVE IDs are visible from assignment, and the full records are published on the release date.</p>

<p>The author of <a href="https://smoores.dev/post/no_npm_estee_is_not_a_typo/">No, npm, “estee” is not a typo of “testem”</a> (smoores.dev) hit npm’s typosquat check while naming a package for the Storyteller project. The registry rejected <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">estee</code> as too similar to <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">espree</code> and <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">testem</code>, then flagged the fallback <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">hoid</code> against <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">hoek</code>, <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">hono</code>, <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">uuid</code> and <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">zod</code>. npm support declined to lift the automated block. The author infers an edit-distance-of-two rule against popular names. Under that rule <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">preact</code> and <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">estree</code> would also be blocked.</p>

<p><a href="https://fzakaria.com/2026/11/06/the-intensional-model-in-disguise">The intensional model in disguise</a> (Farid Zakaria) maps Nix onto Bazel and buck2. Bazel and buck2 key actions by the content of their inputs, so editing a comment in a C file stops the rebuild once the compiled output comes out the same. Nix gets that early cutoff only with content-addressed derivations, because by default it addresses outputs by their recipe. The post lines up Nix’s resolved derivations, realisations and store with Bazel’s actions, action cache and CAS.</p>

<p>Josh Bressers <a href="https://opensourcesecurity.io/2026/2026-11-backport-gaps-roi/">talked to Roi Nisimi</a> about backport gaps: security fixes merged to a project’s main branch but missing from its latest release. Nisimi’s <a href="https://orca.security/resources/blog/fixed-on-main-vulnerable-in-release-hunting-backport-gaps-at-scale/">write-up for Orca Security</a> reports hundreds of confirmed cases from a scan of thousands of repositories. Advisories and published vulnerable ranges are often missing for these fixes, so scanners report the current release as clean.</p>

<h2 id="elsewhere">Elsewhere</h2>

<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0926227x261505352">DCFinder</a> (Xiaoya Zhu et al., Journal of Computer Security) detects dependency confusion in Python projects that use more than one index. It builds the transitive tree from private indexes and PyPI and checks whether the resolver would select a public version. On 28 real projects it reports 88.7% precision and 83.3% recall, against zero detections from the baseline tools.</p>

<p>Vlad Miricioiu, director of the Software Stewardship Lab and one of my FOSDEM devroom co-organisers, <a href="https://redmonk.com/videos/vlad-miricioiu/">talked to RedMonk</a> about binary dependencies, maintainer burnout, funding models and the Bernies. The Stewardship Lab <a href="https://fosstodon.org/@stewardshiplab/117564368531114169">received $5,000 from Syntax and Sentry</a> towards an annual survey of burnout among open source maintainers.</p>

<p><a href="https://lovro-bikic.github.io/software-line-specialist/">Software Line Specialist</a> (Lovro Bikić) is a delightful bit of satire.</p>

<h2 id="git-pkgs">git-pkgs</h2>

<p>I tagged 14 repos this week:</p>

<ul>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/git-pkgs/mailmap/releases/tag/v0.1.1">mailmap v0.1.1</a> (new), a Go library for parsing Git <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">.mailmap</code> files and resolving author identities</li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/git-pkgs/archives/releases/tag/v0.10.1">archives v0.10.1</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/git-pkgs/brief/releases/tag/v0.15.0">brief v0.15.0</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/git-pkgs/cooldown/releases/tag/v0.3.1">cooldown v0.3.1</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/git-pkgs/history/releases/tag/v0.2.0">history v0.2.0</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/git-pkgs/languages/releases/tag/v0.1.0">languages v0.1.0</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/git-pkgs/managers/releases/tag/v0.13.0">managers v0.13.0</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/git-pkgs/manifests/releases/tag/v0.12.4">manifests v0.12.4</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/git-pkgs/proxy/releases/tag/v0.11.0">proxy v0.11.0</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/git-pkgs/reuse/releases/tag/v0.2.0">reuse v0.2.0</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/git-pkgs/sbom/releases/tag/v0.1.9">sbom v0.1.9</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/git-pkgs/secrets/releases/tag/v0.2.0">secrets v0.2.0</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/git-pkgs/signals/releases/tag/v0.1.0">signals v0.1.0</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/git-pkgs/spdx/releases/tag/v0.3.6">spdx v0.3.6</a></li>
</ul>

<p>Send links for next week to <a href="https://mastodon.social/@andrewnez">@andrewnez@mastodon.social</a>.</p>]]></content><author><name>Andrew Nesbitt</name><email>andrew@ecosyste.ms</email></author><category term="package-managers" /><category term="weekly" /><category term="twipm" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[Releases, advisories, and articles from across the package management world]]></summary><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://nesbitt.io/images/boxes.png" /><media:content medium="image" url="https://nesbitt.io/images/boxes.png" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" /></entry><entry><title type="html">Weekend at Bernie’s II</title><link href="https://nesbitt.io/2026/11/06/weekend-at-bernies-ii.html" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Weekend at Bernie’s II" /><published>2026-11-06T10:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2026-11-06T10:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://nesbitt.io/2026/11/06/weekend-at-bernies-ii</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://nesbitt.io/2026/11/06/weekend-at-bernies-ii.html"><![CDATA[<p>Six months after <a href="/2026/05/08/weekend-at-bernies.html">Weekend at Bernie’s</a>, <strong>421</strong> of the critical repos that were dead, dormant or unknown in May are active again. In the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weekend_at_Bernie%27s_II">1993 sequel</a>, Bernie is brought back by a voodoo ceremony that goes slightly wrong, and the result is a corpse that moves whenever it hears music. In nearly a quarter of the revived repos the music shows up in the commit history as a coding agent, with most of those commits made by the repo’s own top committer.</p>

<p>In the previous post I sorted the repos behind the <a href="https://ecosyste.ms">ecosyste.ms</a> critical packages into four buckets, and a follow-up went through the <a href="/2026/05/19/dumb-ways-for-an-open-source-project-to-die.html">ways a project ends up dead</a>:</p>

<ul>
  <li>Active: regular non-bot commits to the default branch, or a release, in the past year.</li>
  <li>Dormant: little or no development, but someone with write access has closed an issue, merged a PR or pushed a commit in the past year.</li>
  <li>Dead: archived, or with issues and PRs filed in the past year and no response from anyone with write access.</li>
  <li>Unknown: no issues, PRs or activity in the past year, so responsiveness hasn’t been tested.</li>
</ul>

<p>In the previous post I predicted that AI-assisted vulnerability discovery was about to test the quiet ones: “The first security report against any of them will be that test.” I re-ran the same pipeline with the same classifier at the start of November, and the headline split is within two points of May’s:</p>

<table>
  <thead>
    <tr>
      <th> </th>
      <th style="text-align: right">May</th>
      <th style="text-align: right">November</th>
      <th style="text-align: right">change</th>
    </tr>
  </thead>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>critical repos</td>
      <td style="text-align: right">5,874</td>
      <td style="text-align: right">6,106</td>
      <td style="text-align: right">+232</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>active</td>
      <td style="text-align: right">48.8%</td>
      <td style="text-align: right">49.9%</td>
      <td style="text-align: right">+1.1</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>dormant</td>
      <td style="text-align: right">20.2%</td>
      <td style="text-align: right">18.7%</td>
      <td style="text-align: right">-1.5</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>dead</td>
      <td style="text-align: right">12.1%</td>
      <td style="text-align: right">11.8%</td>
      <td style="text-align: right">-0.3</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>unknown</td>
      <td style="text-align: right">18.9%</td>
      <td style="text-align: right">19.5%</td>
      <td style="text-align: right">+0.6</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>dead and archived</td>
      <td style="text-align: right">322</td>
      <td style="text-align: right">361</td>
      <td style="text-align: right">+39</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>dead and not archived 😎</td>
      <td style="text-align: right">391</td>
      <td style="text-align: right">361</td>
      <td style="text-align: right">-30</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>advisories with no patched version</td>
      <td style="text-align: right">110</td>
      <td style="text-align: right">133</td>
      <td style="text-align: right">+23</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

<p>Running <a href="https://github.com/andrew/weekend-at-bernies/blob/4783068/classify.rb">May’s classifier</a> over November’s data changes only 23 buckets, so the changes come from activity in the repos, plus older issues and releases dropping out of the one-year window. 421 repos went from dormant, dead or unknown to active, and 295 that were active, dormant or unknown in May are now dead.</p>

<h3 id="who-came-back">Who came back</h3>

<p>Registry maintainer lists changed on the packages of only 16 of the 421 revived repos. Checked against the commit history, one of those is a renamed account, seven are staff rotating inside organisations like Docker and Google, and two added an account with no commits since, which leaves six where a new person took on the work. The registry maintainer lists were unchanged on the other 405. Abandoned-package policies at most registries are built around transferring a dead package to a new owner, one of the few <a href="/2026/06/16/how-open-source-projects-change-hands.html">ways projects change hands</a>, and ownership changes were rare among these revivals.</p>

<p>To see what those returning maintainers were working with, I ran CHAOSS’s <a href="https://github.com/chaoss/disclosure">disclosure</a> tool over every commit in the 416 revived repos hosted on GitHub, covering the year since last November, which is the same measurement I <a href="/2026/08/06/a-year-of-ai-disclosure-in-critical-packages.html">ran across the whole critical set</a> in August. It matches co-author trailers, agent bot emails, agent branch names and similar signals, so the numbers are a lower bound.</p>

<p>In the six months before May, <strong>3.3%</strong> of human-authored commits in those repos carried an AI disclosure, spread over 22 repos. In the six months since, it was <strong>7.9%</strong> over 95 repos, 778 commits in all, and 566 of them came from each repo’s own top committer, usually with a Claude Code trailer. Every disclosed AI commit in the dead and unknown revivals dates from after May, and 10 of the 47 dead ones and 8 of the 64 unknown ones have them.</p>

<p>The heaviest agent users among the revivals include:</p>

<ul>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/stefankoegl/python-json-patch">python-json-patch</a> and <a href="https://github.com/pierrec/lz4">lz4</a> were both dormant in May, and have 123 and 75 agent-assisted commits.</li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/ncr/rack-proxy">rack-proxy</a> was dead. Jacek Becela, who wrote it, has made 39 agent-assisted commits since, the repo now has a <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">CLAUDE.md</code> and an <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">AGENTS.md</code>, and it shipped <a href="https://github.com/ncr/rack-proxy/releases/tag/v1.0.0">1.0.0</a> in July as “the modernization + security-hardening release”, <a href="https://github.com/ncr/rack-proxy/releases/tag/v2.0.0">2.0.0</a> in September with HTTP framing hardening, and <a href="https://github.com/ncr/rack-proxy/releases/tag/v1.0.3">1.0.3</a> as a security patch for the 1.x line.</li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/net-ssh/net-sftp">net-sftp</a> was dead and has 29 agent-assisted commits, a mix of Codex and Claude Code.</li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/JuliaInterop/CEnum.jl">CEnum.jl</a>, a Julia package that was dead in May, has 27.</li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/jgm/zip-archive">zip-archive</a>, a Haskell package that was unknown in May, now has 16.</li>
</ul>

<p>My read of these commit logs is that the agents made the backlog on a finished-but-neglected library small enough to clear, and the maintainers who already knew the code were the ones best placed to check what the agent produced. Running the scan also turned up two gaps in the tool’s detection, and I’ve <a href="https://github.com/chaoss/disclosure/pull/120">sent</a> <a href="https://github.com/chaoss/disclosure/pull/121">fixes</a> for both.</p>

<h3 id="fixes-and-advisories">Fixes and advisories</h3>

<p>Maintainers released fixes for vulnerabilities in their own code in 43 of the revived repos since May. Where the maintainer also published a repository advisory, 19 of 20 went up within a day of the fixed release, and the wait came afterwards, while the advisory was in GitHub’s queue for review into the global Advisory Database:</p>

<ul>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/rgrove/crass">crass</a>, a Ruby CSS parser, had its last issue, PR or commit more than a year before May. Ryan Grove released <a href="https://github.com/rgrove/crass/releases/tag/v1.0.7">1.0.7</a> on 25 June with fixes for four denial-of-service bugs and published the four repository advisories the same day. They reached the reviewed database 116 to 125 days later, including <a href="https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6wmf-3r64-vcwv">GHSA-6wmf-3r64-vcwv</a> on 20 October.</li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/SamVerschueren/decode-uri-component">decode-uri-component</a> had been dead since 2022. Sam Verschueren rewrote the decoder and published <a href="https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vcc3-ghjq-m6fr">GHSA-vcc3-ghjq-m6fr</a> on 29 June, and it was reviewed 63 days later. A second fix and advisory on 23 October, <a href="https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qr28-fpjm-wq7f">GHSA-qr28-fpjm-wq7f</a>, were reviewed within a week.</li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/moment/moment">moment</a> shipped <a href="https://github.com/moment/moment/releases/tag/2.31.0">2.31.0</a> on 15 September with a fix for a path traversal through crafted locale names, and published <a href="https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4p3w-j4w9-5jqw">GHSA-4p3w-j4w9-5jqw</a> the same day, which was reviewed two weeks later. Matt Johnson-Pint wrote 41 of the 68 commits since July.</li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/WinRb/rubyntlm">rubyntlm</a>, dead in May, released <a href="https://github.com/WinRb/rubyntlm/releases/tag/v0.6.6">0.6.6</a> on 9 September to fix an authentication bypass where NTLMv2 responses were being verified against an empty password. Its repository advisory went up the same day, and two months later it is still missing from the reviewed database.</li>
</ul>

<p>GitHub <a href="https://github.blog/security/supply-chain-security/inside-the-advisory-database-and-what-happens-when-vulnerability-volume-breaks-records">wrote about the backlog</a> in June. Private vulnerability reports went from about 550 a week in January to more than 3,000 a week for most of May, and “since mid-April, due to this surge, we have not consistently met our internal goals for publication.”</p>

<p>Across the 1,011 advisories since May that have both a repository advisory and a dated fix, the median gap between the fixed release and the maintainer’s advisory is zero days in every bucket. The median wait from there to the reviewed database was <strong>11 days</strong> for repos that were active in May and <strong>38 days</strong> for repos that were dormant, dead or unknown. Dependabot and <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">npm audit</code> read the reviewed database, so during that wait the users of a revived package get no alert, even though the fixed version and the maintainer’s advisory are both public.</p>

<p>GitHub says it prioritises review by “project impact and severity”. The previously inactive repos waited longer in every severity band, and the ten of their advisories published in June waited 81 days on average, against 17 for advisories from active repos published the same month. That’s 20 advisories in all, five of them from crass, so it’s a pattern and not proof, and my guess is that a package with years of silence in its repo scores low on project impact.</p>

<p>Six of the 43 fixes have an AI tool visible in a release note, branch name or commit:</p>

<ul>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/fribidi/fribidi">fribidi</a>, dormant in May, lists “Security and robustness fixes found by an automated scan (Anthropic’s OSS Scanner)” in its <a href="https://github.com/fribidi/fribidi/releases/tag/v1.0.18">1.0.18 release</a>, including an out-of-bounds write.</li>
  <li>The maintainers of <a href="https://github.com/agrafix/Spock">Spock</a> and <a href="https://github.com/knu/ruby-domain_name">ruby-domain_name</a> merged <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">codex/</code> branches.</li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/nov/openid_connect">openid_connect</a> has a Copilot Autofix commit, and <a href="https://github.com/deadtrickster/ssl_verify_fun.erl">ssl_verify_fun</a> and <a href="https://github.com/iqlusioninc/crates">iqlusioninc/crates</a> have Claude-authored ones.</li>
</ul>

<h3 id="unanswered-reports">Unanswered reports</h3>

<p>Of the 1,086 repos that were unknown in May, 189 got an outside issue or PR since then, which is the test the previous post described. In 94 of them a maintainer closed or merged something, and 17 more had maintainer commits while the outside item went unanswered. The other 78 had no maintainer activity and moved to the dead bucket. Of the 1,171 repos that were dormant in May, which I flagged in the previous post as the bigger worry, 107 are now dead and 310 are active, about three revivals for every new death.</p>

<p>1,345 advisories were published against packages in the set between May and November, and 8.5% of the repos that were active in May got at least one, against about 1% of dormant and dead repos and 0.3% of unknown ones. Those rates count reports that became public, and a public advisory needs someone to receive the private report, write the fix and publish the advisory alongside the release. A private report sent to an unattended repo reaches an advisory database only if the reporter publishes it themselves, so the low rate on dead repos is a poor measure of how many reports they received.</p>

<p>In July a security engineer at Datadog <a href="https://github.com/xeipuuv/gojsonschema/issues/389">opened an issue</a> on <a href="https://github.com/xeipuuv/gojsonschema">gojsonschema</a>, a Go library with about 30,000 dependent repos, saying they’d found what they believed were vulnerabilities and asking the maintainers to turn on GitHub’s private vulnerability reporting or share a contact address, and it has had zero comments since. Other reporters filed publicly instead: one now-dead repo has two open issues titled “[security disclosure]”, another has two titled “Security Advisory”, and all four are unanswered. Finding someone to send a report to is one of the steps I built <a href="/2026/06/25/scrutineer.html">Scrutineer</a> to handle, because AI scanners have made finding the bugs the easy part.</p>

<p>The repos that were active, dormant or unknown in May and are now dead without being archived have 250 open pull requests from outside contributors, all opened in the same six months. I scanned the 103 I could reach on the formerly unknown repos, and 24 disclose AI use, in a trailer, a branch name, or a line like “Drafted with OpenAI Codex.” at the bottom of the description. Those 103 PRs are open against 59 repos, and the latest release on each of them predates May.</p>

<p>Between the end of August and the start of September, Oskar Eichler sent pull requests, most of them from <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">codex/</code> branches, to at least 14 Ruby and JavaScript repos in the set: small fixes and hardening changes, some with a severity like <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">[MEDIUM]</code> in the title. The maintainers of <a href="https://github.com/net-ssh/net-sftp">net-sftp</a>, which was dead in May, merged 15 of them, and the maintainers of <a href="https://github.com/net-ssh/net-scp">net-scp</a> merged 10. The ones on repos that are dead now have had no maintainer reply since they were opened.</p>

<p>On faye’s <a href="https://github.com/faye/websocket-extensions-ruby">websocket-extensions-ruby</a>, James Coglan <a href="https://github.com/faye/websocket-extensions-ruby/pull/8">replied</a> within a day asking what bug the changes fixed, and said the project doesn’t accept code authored by LLMs or agents without meaningful human input. Eichler closed all seven PRs there himself, saying he couldn’t honestly provide that context. As with the AI scanner findings against curl I <a href="/2026/05/12/not-a-security-issue.html">wrote about in May</a>, the project had a stated policy to point to.</p>

<h3 id="releases">Releases</h3>

<p>Of the 3,198 packages in the set that were dormant, dead or unknown in May, 348 have had a new version published since and <strong>2,850</strong> have not. Counted by repo, maintainers published a release for 322 of the 421 revived repos, and on the other 99 the commits and merged PRs since May are unreleased. Until those releases ship, the <a href="/2026/05/01/patching-and-forking-in-package-managers.html">patching and forking workarounds</a> are the remaining option, and each downstream user has to apply them separately.</p>

<p>In the previous post I counted 110 advisories with no patched version, and the same measure gives 133 now. Two more are on packages whose metadata has no repository URL, which makes 135, and most of them come from how advisories are keyed: an advisory counts as unpatched per package name, so when maintainers rename a project or adopt a new major version path, every advisory on the old name counts as unpatched even when the advisory lists the fix under the new one.</p>

<ul>
  <li>61 have a fix recorded in the advisory itself under a different package: <a href="https://packagist.org/packages/phpoffice/phpexcel">phpoffice/phpexcel</a> alone has 19 that were fixed in <a href="https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet">PhpSpreadsheet</a>, <a href="https://github.com/netty/netty">netty</a> 3 has 9 fixed in netty 4’s modules, and <a href="https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/docker/docker">github.com/docker/docker</a> has 4 fixed in <a href="https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/moby/moby/v2">github.com/moby/moby/v2</a>.</li>
  <li>17 are against end-of-life lines whose advisories omit the successor, like <a href="https://central.sonatype.com/artifact/log4j/log4j">log4j 1.x</a> and <a href="https://central.sonatype.com/artifact/org.codehaus.jackson/jackson-mapper-asl">jackson-mapper-asl</a>.</li>
  <li>15 describe behaviour that’s by design or documented, and 9 are misattributed or about code removed years ago.</li>
  <li>4 were rejected or disputed by NVD, and 4 are versions that were published with malware in them.</li>
</ul>

<p>25 advisories have no fix in any version, and 20 of those are on active repos. Debian marks 57 of the 135 as resolved in its own packages, and language registries, which <a href="/2026/05/15/language-registries-are-unstable-by-default.html">work like Debian unstable</a>, have no equivalent downstream packager.</p>

<h3 id="archived-and-deleted">Archived and deleted</h3>

<p>44 repos in the set were archived since May, which closes the project on the record instead of leaving the issue tracker open. webpack archived six of its loaders and plugins, including <a href="https://github.com/webpack/css-loader">css-loader</a> and <a href="https://github.com/webpack/copy-webpack-plugin">copy-webpack-plugin</a>, several with a final commit pointing users at the equivalent now built into webpack. jsdom marked <a href="https://github.com/jsdom/cssstyle">cssstyle</a> and <a href="https://github.com/jsdom/js-symbol-tree">js-symbol-tree</a> as unmaintained, and rust-lang archived <a href="https://github.com/rust-lang-nursery/lazy-static.rs">lazy-static</a> with a deprecation notice and <a href="https://github.com/rust-lang/cfg-if">cfg-if</a> alongside it. Those ten packages have about 16 million dependent repos between them.</p>

<p>Fourteen repos behind critical packages have been deleted, and seven of them belonged to <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220804032815/https://github.com/substack">substack</a>, whose GitHub account is also gone: <a href="https://www.npmjs.com/package/wordwrap">wordwrap</a>, <a href="https://www.npmjs.com/package/text-table">text-table</a>, <a href="https://www.npmjs.com/package/commondir">commondir</a>, <a href="https://www.npmjs.com/package/archy">archy</a>, <a href="https://www.npmjs.com/package/semver-compare">semver-compare</a> and two more. Those packages still install from npm, where six of the seven list a single maintainer, <a href="https://www.npmjs.com/~nopersonsmodules">nopersonsmodules</a>, and that npm account is the only remaining place to send a report or ask for a release. The classifier reads issue data from the repo, so all fourteen are classified as unknown regardless of how many reports they receive.</p>

<p>See you in another six months. Until then, be suspicious of any dependency wearing sunglasses indoors.</p>

<p>🕶️</p>]]></content><author><name>Andrew Nesbitt</name><email>andrew@ecosyste.ms</email></author><category term="open-source" /><category term="security" /><category term="maintainers" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[Six months on, which of your dependencies are still wearing sunglasses?]]></summary><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://nesbitt.io/images/boxes.png" /><media:content medium="image" url="https://nesbitt.io/images/boxes.png" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" /></entry><entry><title type="html">This Week in Source Control: 4 November 2026</title><link href="https://nesbitt.io/2026/11/04/this-week-in-source-control.html" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="This Week in Source Control: 4 November 2026" /><published>2026-11-04T10:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2026-11-04T10:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://nesbitt.io/2026/11/04/this-week-in-source-control</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://nesbitt.io/2026/11/04/this-week-in-source-control.html"><![CDATA[<p>This week’s version control and forge news, gathered from release feeds for source control clients and forges, the <a href="https://lobste.rs/t/vcs">Lobsters vcs tag</a>, Hacker News, and my boosts on <a href="https://mastodon.social/@andrewnez">Mastodon</a>. Package management news is in the Saturday <a href="/2026/10/31/this-week-in-package-management.html">This Week in Package Management</a> roundup.</p>

<h2 id="scaling">Scaling</h2>

<p><a href="https://openai.com/index/scaling-git-at-openai/">Scaling Git at OpenAI</a> (Aaron Friel, Taylor Blau and Ted Nyman, OpenAI) describes Pando, a Rust backend for git repositories that now serves all development in OpenAI’s monorepo. Each push is stored as an immutable packfile in blob storage, and each branch update records a ref version in a metadata store, so pushes contend only when they target the same ref. The trade-off is causal consistency, so a client reading several branches can see them at different points in time.</p>

<p>When a new branch is pushed, Pando advertises only trunk, which keeps the pushed pack reusable for anyone who already has trunk, and the median pack produced this way was under 20 KiB. On a fetch, Pando sends an empty packfile in the response and lists the packs the client needs as packfile-uri links. The client downloads those packs from a regional cache with a hit rate above 99%.</p>

<p>Background compaction merges small packs into larger ones in levels, up to L4 in the monorepo, and the levels double as a skip list for choosing which packs a client needs. OpenAI reports median push latency down by nearly 80% and nearly a petabyte of git data served a day. Fixes to packfile-uri downloads have gone upstream, and other changes, such as downloading and indexing packs in parallel, are in <a href="https://github.com/openai/git">OpenAI’s git fork</a>.</p>

<p><a href="https://typesanitizer.com/blog/scion.html">An outsider’s perspective on Scion and Mononoke</a> (typesanitizer) responds to Anthropic’s Scion post from someone on the source control team at Databricks, whose monorepo’s main branch history is 20-50GB. The author lists the parts of Scion’s design that already exist in Mononoke, Perforce or Piper, such as per-directory ACLs, server-side history queries and changesets in place of git trees.</p>

<p>They also question Anthropic’s mirror count: Databricks serves CI from fewer than 10 git mirrors and reference repositories refreshed every two hours, while Anthropic reported running several hundred mirrors at its peak.</p>

<p><a href="https://delta.dev/blog/fine-grained-version-control-for-agents">Building fine-grained version control for agents</a> (Antonio Scandurra, Delta) describes DeltaDB from the team behind Zed. Each agent thread is a DAG of CRDT deltas stored in SQLite on the client and synced to one Cloudflare Durable Object per thread.</p>

<p>Worktrees are layered on top of git, starting from a commit and recording edits as deltas, and creating a commit adds a delta that links the DAG back to git’s history. Subagents work on separate timelines in the same DAG and merge back into it, and coordinating agents this way needs no git commit.</p>

<p><a href="https://thenewstack.io/github-7-4b-commits-september/">GitHub saw 7.4B commits in September</a> (Frederic Lardinois, The New Stack) reports figures from GitHub Universe. GitHub had 1.4 billion commits a month in April and 2.9 billion in August. It has added 4 million CPU cores and 160 PB of storage this year, alongside the move to separate compute and storage covered in <a href="/2026/10/28/this-week-in-source-control.html">last week’s issue</a>.</p>

<h2 id="releases">Releases</h2>

<p><a href="https://github.com/meta/sapling/releases/tag/0.2.20261028-123539%2B7415fb2f">Sapling 0.2.20261028</a> makes <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">sl worktree</code> work in checkouts made with <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">git clone</code>, using <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">git worktree add</code> underneath, and ships it in builds without EdenFS, including the open source ones. <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">sl drop -r REV</code> is now on by default and removes commits from a stack, rebasing their descendants.</p>

<p>This release also adds a <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">--plan</code> flag to <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">histedit</code> for giving the plan on the command line, plus an <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">into</code> verb that folds the previous commit in while keeping the current message. Rewriting a commit in the middle of a stack now works with <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">uncommit</code> too. <a href="https://github.com/meta/sapling/releases/tag/0.2.20261102-153821%2Ba53273dc">0.2.20261102</a> fixes a regression from that release, where files under directories matched by rules like <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">target/</code> showed up as untracked and nested <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">.gitignore</code> files were skipped.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.com/ivankovic/omnidiff/releases/tag/v0.3.0">OmniDiff 0.3.0</a> is the latest release of Marko Ivankovic’s content-aware difftool in Rust. It was on Hacker News this week and diffs code by syntax, along with pictures, fonts, archives and PDFs. This release diffs code embedded in strings as its own language, for example shell in a YAML <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">run:</code> block or CSS in template literals, and diffs CSS class lists one class at a time.</p>

<p>The <a href="https://gitroot.dev/blog/version-0.5.0-plugins.html">GitRoot 0.5.0 plugins</a> include Firefly, which is written in Zig and generates status pages inside the forge. Silo, which builds indexes from files and their metadata, can now render them to the web grouped by any property, and Apex, the plugin that renders repository files to the web, adds a slide layout.</p>

<p><a href="https://blog.gitea.com/release-of-gitea-cli-1.0.0/">gt 1.0.0</a> is the first stable release of the Gitea command line tool <a href="/2026/10/28/this-week-in-source-control.html">introduced last week</a>, and it replaces tea as Gitea’s official CLI. tea is discontinued and its repository archived. A migration guide maps its commands and flags to gt’s. Commands, flags, <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">--json</code> fields and exit codes now follow semantic versioning. Changes since 0.1.0 include:</p>

<ul>
  <li><code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">gt upgrade</code> replaces the binary after checking its SHA-256 checksum, or names the package manager command when gt came from Homebrew, Nix, a Linux package or <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">go install</code>.</li>
  <li>Extensions named <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">gt-NAME</code> install from any Gitea instance, and GitHub CLI extensions that avoid GitHub’s APIs also run.</li>
  <li><code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">gt pr backport</code> cherry-picks a merged pull request onto one or more release branches and opens a pull request into each.</li>
  <li>Every command with <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">--json</code> also takes <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">--csv</code>.</li>
</ul>

<p><a href="https://github.com/narnaud/git-loom/releases/tag/v1.0.0">git-loom 1.0</a> merges a set of feature branches into one integration branch, where they are built and tested together. Its commands commit, amend, split and move changes between those branches while the integration branch stays checked out, and rewrite history so each stays a side branch joined by a merge.</p>

<p>Stacked branches are pushed as one pull request each to GitHub, GitLab, Azure DevOps or Gerrit. Commits get short IDs from a <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">Change-Id</code> trailer, so the IDs stay the same across rewrites. With 1.0 the commands, <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">loom.*</code> settings and agent mode follow semantic versioning, and it requires Git 2.43 or later.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.com/Wilfred/difftastic/releases/tag/0.72.0">difftastic 0.72.0</a> changes its preprocessing heuristics so it falls back to text diffing less often, and updates the Haskell and Kotlin parsers. Verilog, F# and Smali support is removed. The Verilog and F# parsers made the <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">difft</code> binary large, and the upstream Smali parser is unmaintained. It also fixes terminal width detection when stdin, stdout and stderr are all redirected, which broke in 0.71 and was most noticeable when running difft from jj.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.com/gitbutlerapp/gitbutler/releases/tag/release%2F0.23.2">GitButler 0.23.2</a> stops commits and amends from disturbing staged files, and undo now restores deleted branches after a git garbage collection. Merge request listing also works on older GitLab instances. On the command line, <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">but agent setup</code> adds Amp support, and <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">but worktree new --above</code> takes branch names and IDs as well as git revisions.</p>

<p>Also out: <a href="https://github.com/danielroe/forges/releases/tag/v0.3.1">forges v0.3.1</a>.</p>

<h2 id="security">Security</h2>

<p><a href="https://blog.gitea.com/release-of-28.3.0/">Gitea 28.3.0</a> fixes 21 CVEs, many of them places where public-only tokens could reach private data or admin actions. Among them:</p>

<ul>
  <li>With <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">ACCOUNT_LINKING = auto</code> and open registration, someone signing in through an OAuth2 provider could enter another user’s name or email and be linked to that existing account with only the OAuth2 sign-in (CVE-2026-120263).</li>
  <li>A user with read access could submit a pull request review whose <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">commit_id</code> named their own commit, so <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">pull_request_review</code> workflows ran from that commit with the repository’s secrets and a write token (CVE-2026-118386).</li>
  <li>A site administrator’s public-only token could use the admin API to list every user’s email address and create new administrators (CVE-2026-117635).</li>
  <li>An organization owner’s public-only token had enough access to delete all of the organization’s repositories, private ones included (CVE-2026-119441).</li>
  <li>Release binaries are built with Go 1.27.3, which rejects certificates chained through the eMudhra intermediates, for Gitea’s outgoing connections to OAuth2 providers, webhooks, mirrors and migrations (CVE-2026-111943). Saturday’s <a href="/2026/10/31/this-week-in-package-management.html">package management roundup</a> has more on that incident, including a test page showing that the git Apple ships with macOS still accepts those certificates.</li>
</ul>

<p>Alpine Linux <a href="https://alpinelinux.org/posts/GitLab-security-incident-CVE-2026-97229.html">rebuilt its GitLab instance</a> after an attacker tried to exploit CVE-2026-97229 on 20 and 21 October. The bug is in Onigmo, Ruby’s regular expression engine, and GitLab’s fix is a patch applied to the Ruby in its official packages. Alpine’s image used standard Ruby, so upgrading GitLab on 22 October left it vulnerable.</p>

<p>The attacker crashed worker processes eight times, and Alpine found no evidence of code execution. A check on 26 October turned up the unpatched Ruby, and the instance was rebuilt and reopened on 29 October. The aports repository and packages, including the 21 October releases, were checked against outside records, and all passwords were reset. GitLab installs that use their own Ruby also need Ruby 3.3.13, 3.4.12, 4.0.9 or later.</p>

<p><a href="https://www.mongodb.com/company/blog/technical/scanning-7-point-25-million-public-repositories-chinas-largest-git-platform-for-secrets">Scanning 7.25M public repositories on Gitee for secrets</a> (Ben Zimmermann, MongoDB) found 26,400 unique verified-live credentials using TruffleHog and Kingfisher. The only official Gitee API endpoint that returned useful data at that size was user search, so the repository list was built from that, Explore feeds, per-user pages and the Elasticsearch widget behind the site’s search. GitHub runs secret-scanning partnerships with credential issuers, and Gitee has no public equivalent.</p>

<h2 id="github">GitHub</h2>

<p><a href="https://github.blog/changelog/2026-11-02-github-desktop-adds-short-lived-authentication-tokens">GitHub Desktop 3.6.10 and later can sign in with short-lived tokens</a> that refresh automatically for API requests and git operations. The rollout is gradual and covers github.com only. Existing tokens stay as they are, and an installation gets short-lived tokens at its first sign-in after the rollout reaches it.</p>

<p>The <a href="https://github.com/desktop/desktop/releases/tag/release-3.6.8">3.6.8 release notes</a> list the change alongside Git 2.56.0, Git LFS 3.8.1 and Git Credential Manager 2.9.1. <a href="https://github.com/desktop/desktop/releases/tag/release-3.6.10">3.6.10</a> bundles <a href="https://github.com/git-for-windows/git/releases/tag/v2.56.0.windows.4">Git for Windows 2.56.0.windows.4</a>, whose brotli upgrade to 1.2.1 fixes CVE-2026-111497.</p>

<p>Pull request limits can now <a href="https://github.blog/changelog/2026-10-28-pull-request-limits-exempt-contributors-by-age-or-history">exempt contributors by account age or by number of merged pull requests</a> in that repository. A contributor who meets either enabled rule can open pull requests beyond the cap.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.blog/changelog/2026-10-28-push-protection-beyond-predefined-secret-patterns">Push protection can block AI-detected secrets</a>, in public preview, using a classifier that scores a value by how the surrounding code uses it, in place of format matching. GitHub reports it more than doubled the number of pushes where push protection caught a secret. It is opt-in and requires AI-detected secret scanning and push protection to be enabled first.</p>

<p>The Meta API now lists <a href="https://github.blog/changelog/2026-10-29-webhook-ip-ranges-added-to-the-meta-api">three more IP ranges for webhook deliveries</a> in its <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">hooks</code> field. Static allowlists for incoming webhooks need the new CIDR prefixes added.</p>

<h2 id="elsewhere">Elsewhere</h2>

<p>Tangled has <a href="https://tangled.org/blog/forge">relaunched as a federated code forge</a> on the AT Protocol. Knot2, a rewrite of its git server in Rust, stores issues, pull requests, comments and labels in the repository as collaborative objects, chains of git objects synced over the AT Protocol firehose. Each edit also writes an attestation record to the author’s own PDS.</p>

<p>The release adds organization accounts and stacked pull requests with interdiffs for git and jj users. A new Svelte frontend is served from read-only Rust indexers in 11 or more regions, and self-hosted knots need upgrading to v1.20.0.</p>

<p>David Bushell <a href="https://dbushell.com/2026/11/01/tangled-accessibility/">responded to the new Tangled UI</a> with an accessibility review. The interface sets text at 12px, and a <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">font-size: 16px</code> on the <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">&lt;html&gt;</code> element fixes the root size regardless of browser settings. Forcing a 200% resize clips and truncates text, which fails WCAG 2.2’s 1.4.4 Resize Text criterion.</p>

<p>Forgejo is <a href="https://forgejo.org/2026-11-removing-openid/">removing OpenID 2.0 sign-in</a> in v19, due on 25 March 2027, and keeping OpenID Connect and OAuth. The v15 LTS keeps OpenID 2.0 until its end of life on 15 July 2027, and v17 and v18 keep it until 29 April 2027.</p>

<p><a href="https://git.github.io/rev_news/2026/10/31/edition-140/">Git Rev News 140</a> leads with a fix for <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">git push --force-if-includes</code>, which rejected valid force pushes when the remote-tracking ref had no reflog. A ref created by <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">git clone</code> with the files backend gets its first reflog entry when it moves, and before that a cut-off timestamp was left uninitialised.</p>

<p>Aleksei Sviridkin’s one-line patch sets it to 0. In review Junio Hamano suggested a 90-day cut-off, then agreed to 0 after Tyler Cipriani described a case with default gc settings where the cut-off gives the wrong answer.</p>

<p>The first version of the patch carried an <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">Assisted-by: LLM</code> trailer following Linux kernel practice. After Junio pointed to the AI section of Git’s <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">SubmittingPatches</code>, version 3 of the patch dropped the trailer.</p>

<p>Send links for next week to <a href="https://mastodon.social/@andrewnez">@andrewnez@mastodon.social</a>.</p>]]></content><author><name>Andrew Nesbitt</name><email>andrew@ecosyste.ms</email></author><category term="git" /><category term="weekly" /><category term="twisc" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[Releases, advisories, and articles from across version control and forges]]></summary><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://nesbitt.io/images/boxes.png" /><media:content medium="image" url="https://nesbitt.io/images/boxes.png" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" /></entry><entry><title type="html">This Week in Package Management: 31 October 2026</title><link href="https://nesbitt.io/2026/10/31/this-week-in-package-management.html" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="This Week in Package Management: 31 October 2026" /><published>2026-10-31T10:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2026-10-31T10:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://nesbitt.io/2026/10/31/this-week-in-package-management</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://nesbitt.io/2026/10/31/this-week-in-package-management.html"><![CDATA[<p>This week’s package management news, gathered from the <a href="https://github.com/ecosyste-ms/package-managers-opml">package manager OPML feed collection</a>, my posts and boosts on <a href="https://mastodon.social/@andrewnez">Mastodon</a>, and anything people sent me.</p>

<h2 id="security">Security</h2>

<p>The Go blog’s <a href="https://go.dev/blog/emudhra-incident">eMudhra post-incident writeup</a> covers Go’s first URGENT-track security release: Mozilla added eight eMudhra intermediates to OneCRL on 17 October, the Go security team was alerted on 19 October, and Go 1.27.3 and 1.26.10 shipped under seven and a half hours later with a patch that rejects any chain through those intermediates. The post also says Go plans to add revocation checking on Linux. A <a href="https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/apple.html">test page</a> shows the git, curl and python3 that Apple ships with macOS still trusted the eMudhra intermediates on 28 October, and macOS 27.2 undid the workaround users had applied by hand.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.com/sbt/sbt/releases/tag/v1.13.1">sbt 1.13.1</a> and 2.0.12 fix a zip slip in <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">IO.unzip</code> and its variants (<a href="https://github.com/sbt/sbt/security/advisories/GHSA-p8jf-532w-4p65">GHSA-p8jf-532w-4p65</a>) that an earlier fix missed. <a href="https://github.com/pypa/pipx/releases/tag/1.18.7">pipx 1.18.7</a> now requires pip 26.2.2 or later in its shared libraries and replaces an older shared pip on the next pipx command instead of waiting for the 30-day refresh.</p>

<h2 id="releases">Releases</h2>

<p><a href="https://blog.packagist.com/composer-2-11-release/">Composer 2.11</a> adds a cooldown dependency policy that withholds newly published versions for a configured period during <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">update</code> and <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">require</code>, with a <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">--no-cooldown</code> flag for installing a security fix straight away. It also removes the source fallback deprecated in 2.10 and lets custom policies block during <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">composer install</code>. <a href="https://github.com/composer/composer/releases/tag/2.11.1">2.11.1</a> fixes GitLab CI job tokens against GitLab’s Composer registry.</p>

<p><a href="https://pnpm.io/blog/releases/12.16.0">pnpm 12.16</a> adds a global <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">--env-file</code> flag and fixes two security issues, one in zstd decompression and one in signing. <a href="https://pnpm.io/blog/releases/12.17.0">12.17</a> adds <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">pnpm peers check --global</code> and dependency-group selectors and wildcards in <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">overrides</code>, and <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">pnpm outdated</code> and <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">pnpm update</code> now cover runtime and package manager versions plus Cargo and Python dependencies. <a href="https://pnpm.io/blog/releases/11.28.9">11.28.9</a> fixes a crash on registry responses with too many content encodings (<a href="https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xjj6-f33q-929c">GHSA-xjj6-f33q-929c</a>) and sizes the install worker pool from the container’s CPU quota.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.com/Homebrew/brew/releases/tag/7.0.11">Homebrew 7.0.11</a> verifies formula patch downloads from the API and requires verifiable sources for official formulae.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.com/jdx/mise/releases/tag/v2026.10.25">mise 2026.10.21 to 2026.10.25</a> adds <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">mise bootstrap --config-dir</code> so mise’s global config can be kept in a dotfiles checkout, deploys Stow-style packages without a per-package table, and lets <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">mise bootstrap packages prune --force</code> remove casks it cannot prove are unchanged.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.com/pypa/hatch/releases/tag/hatch-v1.18.2">Hatch 1.18.2</a> and <a href="https://github.com/pypa/hatch/releases/tag/hatchling-v1.33.0">Hatchling 1.33.0</a> support Python 3.15. Hatch’s managed 3.15 distributions are now the final 3.15.2 release (the release notes say 3.15.0, but the later version picked up the eMudhra certificate fixes), and the default test matrix includes 3.15 and the free-threaded <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">3.15t</code>.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.com/oras-project/oras/releases/tag/v1.3.6">ORAS 1.3.6</a> narrows the bearer-realm denylist that 1.3.5 introduced. 1.3.5 rejected realms on any private address, which broke self-hosted split-host registries such as GitLab. The default now blocks only loopback, link-local, unspecified and cloud metadata addresses.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/releases/tag/v2.16.0-rc1">Harbor 2.16.0-rc1</a> replaces Redis with Valkey as the cache backend and builds for amd64 and arm64. It also proxies the referrers API to the upstream registry with paging and local merge.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.com/conan-io/conan/releases/tag/2.34.0">Conan 2.34.0</a> makes a third fewer local cache database calls on installs from cache, sends original URLs to backup source remotes in an <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">X-Conan-Origin-Urls</code> header, and adds a <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">command_alias.conf</code> file for command shortcuts.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.com/gradle/gradle/releases/tag/v9.9.0-RC1">Gradle 9.9.0 RC1</a> keeps wrapper settings when upgrading the wrapper, filters non-method JUnit Platform tests, and compiles Kotlin DSL scripts faster.</p>

<p><a href="https://optimizedbyotto.com/post/debcraft-1-0-released/">Debcraft 1.0</a> (Otto Kekäläinen) builds Debian packages in a Podman or Docker container made from the suite in <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">debian/changelog</code> and the build dependencies in <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">debian/control</code>. It diffs the artifacts between two builds and automates importing new upstream versions.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/releases/tag/44.189.0">Renovate 44.189.0</a> applies vulnerability alerts to transitive dependencies, opening security updates that change only the lockfile. <a href="https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/releases/tag/44.194.0">44.194.0</a> adds a manager for <a href="https://fsprojects.github.io/Paket/">Paket</a>, the .NET dependency manager. <a href="https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/releases/tag/44.184.0">44.184.0</a> reports <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">gh actions-lock</code> findings when the command fails and re-pins only the updated refs in <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">actions.lock</code>.</p>

<p>Also out:</p>

<ul>
  <li><a href="https://blog.rubygems.org/2026/10/28/4.1.0.beta3-released.html">RubyGems 4.1.0.beta3</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/astral-sh/uv/releases/tag/0.13.6">uv 0.13.6</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/astral-sh/setup-uv/releases/tag/v10.3.3">setup-uv 10.3.3</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/pdm-project/pdm/releases/tag/2.29.5">PDM 2.29.5</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/sbt/sbt/releases/tag/v2.1.0-RC2">sbt 2.1.0-RC2</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://salsa.debian.org/apt-team/apt/-/tags/3.3.5">APT 3.3.5</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/chocolatey/choco/releases/tag/2.7.5">Chocolatey 2.7.5</a> and <a href="https://github.com/chocolatey/choco/releases/tag/1.4.8">1.4.8</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/PowerShell/PSResourceGet/releases/tag/v1.3.0-rc2">PSResourceGet 1.3.0-rc2</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/microsoft/vcpkg-tool/releases/tag/2026-10-29">vcpkg tool 2026-10-29</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/vltpkg/vltpkg/releases/tag/v1.6.1">vlt 1.6.1</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/verdaccio/verdaccio/releases/tag/v7.0.2">Verdaccio 7.0.2</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://docs.easybuild.io/release-notes/">EasyBuild 5.4.2</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/podman-container-tools/podman/releases/tag/v6.2.0-rc1">Podman 6.2.0-rc1</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/hashicorp/terraform/releases/tag/v1.17.1">Terraform 1.17.1</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/opentofu/opentofu/releases/tag/v1.13.5">OpenTofu 1.13.5</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/dependabot/dependabot-core/releases/tag/v0.402.0">Dependabot Core 0.402.0</a></li>
</ul>

<h2 id="articles">Articles</h2>

<p><a href="https://astral.sh/blog/tar-codec">tar-codec</a> (William Woodruff, Astral) is a new Rust tar library and uv’s default tar reader as of 0.13. It is roughly twice as fast as the previous reader and reduces the risk of parser differentials: it refuses archives whose headers mix tar families, allows at most one GNU long-name and one long-link record per member, and refuses pax tombstones. <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">UV_LEGACY_TAR_BACKEND=1</code> restores the old reader.</p>

<p><a href="https://vlt.io/blog/consistent-ish-graph">A consistent(-ish) npm dependency graph</a> (Evert Pot, vlt) finds that 22% of new npm versions in a 24-hour window arrived with at least one dependency still missing from the registry. vlt’s npm replication now holds a publish until its transitive dependencies are also available, and releases anything still held after an hour.</p>

<p><a href="https://blog.pypi.org/posts/2026-10-23-version-length-limit/">PyPI now limits versions to 128 characters</a>. Two of the roughly 9.9 million releases on PyPI have a version that long, half have five characters or fewer, and 99% have twenty or fewer. Projects owned by a PyPI organisation now get <a href="https://blog.pypi.org/posts/2026-10-26-higher-limits-for-organization-projects/">higher default limits</a>: 200 MB per file instead of 100 MB, 20 GB per project instead of 10 GB, and ten new projects per day.</p>

<p><a href="https://blog.rust-lang.org/2026/10/26/how-to-fund-rust-contributors/">How to fund Rust contributors</a> (Jakub Beránek, Rust Blog) sets out three routes: the Rust Foundation Maintainers Fund or RustNL Maintainers Team for general maintenance, fundable Rust Project Goals for specific features, and GitHub Sponsors for individual contributors.</p>

<p><a href="https://blog.rubygems.org/2026/10/28/ruby-centrals-oss-changelog-october-2026.html">Ruby Central’s OSS Changelog</a> is back after a long gap. RubyGems.org now validates gem pushes against a schema built from the metadata of all 180,000+ published gems, and it revoked every legacy API key after a report that its CDN could cache that endpoint’s responses and serve them to the wrong user. The Gem Security team has scanned about 317 of 619 heavily downloaded gems with AI models. Reviewers rejected 120 of 134 findings, and one that survived was a critical password check bug in <a href="https://rubygems.org/gems/rubyntlm">rubyntlm</a>, fixed in 0.6.6.</p>

<p><a href="https://www.jvt.me/posts/2026/10/30/renovate-buckets/">Thirteen backlogs in a trenchcoat</a> (Jamie Tanna) sorts Renovate’s open backlog of 1,688 ideas, 1,005 issues and 465 human-authored PRs into 13 buckets of work. Renovate’s own bot opened 59% of the project’s pull requests in 2025.</p>

<h2 id="papers">Papers</h2>

<p><a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.34187">The Policies of Programming Language Ecosystems</a> (Jukka Ruohonen et al., arXiv) codes the published policies of eight package registries against 38 categories. All eight cover malware, intellectual property and content removal, while treatment of package size limits, metric manipulation, typo-squatting and binary uploads varies.</p>

<p><a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.20638">Supply Chain Insecurity: Exposing Vulnerabilities in iOS Dependency Management Systems</a> (David Schmidt et al., arXiv) finds that iOS apps expose internal CocoaPods package names, which attackers can then register to run code on developer machines and build servers. Across 9,212 apps, hijacking a single CocoaPod through an abandoned domain could have compromised 63 of them.</p>

<h2 id="elsewhere">Elsewhere</h2>

<p>The call for participation for the <a href="https://stewardshiplab.org/ideas/cfp-package-management-devroom-at-fosdem-27/">Package Management devroom at FOSDEM 2027</a> is open until 1 December. I’m co-organising with Vlad Miricioiu, Wolf Vollprecht and Travis Hathaway. The <a href="https://lists.fosdem.org/hyperkitty/list/fosdem@lists.fosdem.org/thread/AEQLZMEQVYQDLN52AUEDHGYJ3EO4EZ3N/">Ruby devroom</a> is also back for the first time in several years.</p>

<p><a href="https://blog.easybuild.io/2026/10/30/easybuild-hpsf/">EasyBuild has been accepted to join the High Performance Software Foundation</a> at the Core stage, the highest of HPSF’s three project stages. Joining formally still requires making EasyBuild a Linux Foundation Europe project first.</p>

<p>Michał Górny’s <a href="https://blogs.gentoo.org/mgorny/2026/10/27/the-next-circle-of-security-hell/">The next circle of security hell</a> is a follow-up to his 2021 “modern packager’s security nightmare” post, on vulnerability report volume and projects that bundle security fixes with feature and API changes.</p>

<p>Josh Bressers <a href="https://opensourcesecurity.io/2026/10-embargo/">wrote up</a> curl’s new policy of handling low and medium severity reports in public, covered here last week, and argues other projects should adopt it.</p>

<h2 id="git-pkgs">git-pkgs</h2>

<p>I tagged 6 repos this week:</p>

<ul>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/git-pkgs/purl2swhid/releases/tag/v0.1.0">purl2swhid v0.1.0</a> (new), which turns a Package URL into a Software Heritage identifier and can request archival through Save Code Now</li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/git-pkgs/skills/releases/tag/v0.2.0">skills v0.2.0</a> (new), a Go library for finding and parsing <a href="https://agentskills.io/specification">Agent Skills</a> in checkouts and package archives</li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/git-pkgs/typosquatting/releases/tag/v0.1.0">typosquatting v0.1.0</a> (new), a Go library that generates package-name variants and checks names against a supplied corpus for PyPI, npm, RubyGems, Cargo, Go and GitHub Actions</li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/git-pkgs/enrichment/releases/tag/v0.7.5">enrichment v0.7.5</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/git-pkgs/purl/releases/tag/v0.2.1">purl v0.2.1</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/git-pkgs/registries/releases/tag/v0.13.0">registries v0.13.0</a></li>
</ul>

<p>Send links for next week to <a href="https://mastodon.social/@andrewnez">@andrewnez@mastodon.social</a>.</p>]]></content><author><name>Andrew Nesbitt</name><email>andrew@ecosyste.ms</email></author><category term="package-managers" /><category term="weekly" /><category term="twipm" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[Releases, advisories, and articles from across the package management world]]></summary><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://nesbitt.io/images/boxes.png" /><media:content medium="image" url="https://nesbitt.io/images/boxes.png" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" /></entry><entry><title type="html">Signing and Attestations Across Package Registries</title><link href="https://nesbitt.io/2026/10/30/signing-and-attestations-across-package-registries.html" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Signing and Attestations Across Package Registries" /><published>2026-10-30T10:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2026-10-30T10:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://nesbitt.io/2026/10/30/signing-and-attestations-across-package-registries</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://nesbitt.io/2026/10/30/signing-and-attestations-across-package-registries.html"><![CDATA[<p>Package signing and attestations are two ways of attaching evidence to a published artifact so that someone downloading it later can check where it came from. A signature binds the bytes to a key, either the registry’s or the author’s. A provenance attestation is a signed statement about where an artifact came from, usually in-toto and signed through <a href="https://www.sigstore.dev/">Sigstore</a>. SLSA build provenance names the source repository, commit and build workflow, while a publish attestation such as PyPI’s records which trusted publisher uploaded the file.</p>

<p>Trusted publishing, which several registries have added alongside attestations, replaces long-lived API tokens with short-lived OIDC credentials from CI. It makes provenance easy to produce because the registry receives a verified workflow identity with each upload. Some registries offer trusted publishing on its own. The workflow’s identity becomes the publishing credential, so a compromised workflow can publish a malicious release. <a href="/2026/05/25/github-actions-security-in-python-packages.html">GitHub Actions security in Python packages</a> audits those workflows for PyPI.</p>

<p>Linux distributions have signed packages for decades. Debian builds binaries from uploaded source on its own <a href="https://wiki.debian.org/buildd">buildd</a> machines and Fedora builds through <a href="https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/package-maintainers/Using_the_Koji_Build_System/">Koji</a>, and the archive key signs the result, so a package apt or dnf accepts is one the distribution built, from source uploaded by one of a vetted group of packagers.</p>

<p>Language registries accept uploads from anyone with an account, and the wheel, gem, crate or tarball was built wherever its author built it, on a laptop or a CI runner. A registry signature over those bytes shows they match what was uploaded, which protects against a tampered mirror. A release pushed with a stolen token gets the same signature as one from the project’s real workflow.</p>

<p>Attestations record the build itself: when <a href="https://blog.pypi.org/posts/2024-12-11-ultralytics-attack-analysis/">Ultralytics</a> was compromised in December 2024, the first malicious releases came out of the project’s release workflow with valid attestations, and a later batch uploaded with a leaked API token carried none, which let investigators separate the token uploads from the workflow releases.</p>

<p>The registries are the same set as the <a href="/2026/08/18/two-factor-authentication-across-package-registries.html">2FA survey</a> in August, and for each one I looked at what it signs and where it stores the evidence, plus whether the client checks it by default. <a href="/2026/05/24/signing-is-for-the-bad-days.html">Signing is for the bad days</a> explains the reasons for TUF and in-toto, and for Sigstore. Zach Steindler’s <a href="https://archive.fosdem.org/2026/schedule/event/BCFZP7-current-state-programming-language-attestations/">FOSDEM talk</a> (<a href="https://coffeehousecoders.org/blog/fosdem_2026.html">written summary</a>) covers npm, PyPI, RubyGems and Maven Central in more detail.</p>

<p>In a <a href="https://github.com/in-toto/friends/pull/118">pull request to in-toto/friends</a>, merged in September 2026, Sivana Hamer at NC State catalogued where in-toto attestations are stored. The pull request adds a producer table covering package registries, Git repositories and releases, OCI image manifests and referrers, GitHub’s attestation API, Archivista and Rekor. For each one it records whether attestations are stored alongside the artifact, which format they use, and whether they can be private. Hamer co-authored <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.05014">a study of 1,523 SLSA-related GitHub issues</a>, whose authors identified complex implementation and unclear communication as the main obstacles to adopting SLSA, and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3714464">Research Directions in Software Supply Chain Security</a> with Laurie Williams.</p>

<h2 id="sigstore">Sigstore</h2>

<p>npm <a href="https://github.blog/security/supply-chain-security/introducing-npm-package-provenance/">launched provenance</a> in April 2023 as an opt-in <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">--provenance</code> flag for packages built on GitHub Actions or GitLab CI/CD cloud runners from a public repository whose URL matches the <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">repository</code> field in package.json. Since <a href="https://github.blog/changelog/2025-07-31-npm-trusted-publishing-with-oidc-is-generally-available/">trusted publishing went GA</a> in July 2025, provenance is generated by default when publishing that way. The packument lists it in <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">dist.attestations</code>, and the bundles are served from <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">/-/npm/v1/attestations/&lt;package&gt;@&lt;version&gt;</code>.</p>

<p>Each version published with provenance has two bundles there: a SLSA v1 provenance statement signed with a Sigstore certificate, and an npm publish attestation signed with a registry key that Sigstore’s trust root includes. npm designed its publish predicate before in-toto had a release attestation type, and the later <a href="https://github.com/in-toto/attestation/blob/main/spec/predicates/release.md">in-toto release predicate</a> records the same claim in another format.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.blog/changelog/2026-04-06-npm-trusted-publishing-now-supports-circleci/">CircleCI</a> was added as a trusted publisher in April 2026, with provenance still limited to GitHub Actions and GitLab publishes, and every provider requires cloud-hosted runners. After the <a href="https://workos.com/blog/npm-trusted-publishing-slugfest">SlugFest</a> report showed trust configurations were bound to a repository’s name instead of its ID, npm now <a href="https://github.blog/changelog/2026-10-02-unvalidated-npm-trusted-publishing-configurations-now-expire/">expires unvalidated configurations</a> after 48 hours and rejects <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">issue_comment</code> triggers.</p>

<p>PyPI added <a href="https://docs.pypi.org/trusted-publishers/">trusted publishing</a> in April 2023, <a href="https://blog.pypi.org/posts/2023-05-23-removing-pgp/">stopped accepting PGP signatures</a> the following month, and saw <a href="https://peps.python.org/pep-0740/">PEP 740</a> attestations go <a href="https://blog.sigstore.dev/pypi-attestations-ga/">generally available</a> in November 2024. <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish</code> generates attestations by default for projects using trusted publishing, using PyPI’s own <a href="https://docs.pypi.org/attestations/publish/v1/">publish predicate</a> in place of SLSA build provenance: the provenance object for pip 26.2.2’s wheel contains a single publish attestation from GitHub. PyPI accepts GitHub Actions, GitLab CI/CD, Google Cloud and ActiveState as publishers, with a beta for self-managed GitLab since November 2025.</p>

<p>PyPI’s attestations are per file, served from the <a href="https://docs.pypi.org/api/integrity/">integrity API</a> at <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">/integrity/&lt;project&gt;/&lt;version&gt;/&lt;filename&gt;/provenance</code> and linked from each file in the Simple JSON API. They use PyPI’s own envelope format around the Sigstore material, and PEP 740 permits attestations to be added to a file after upload, so a collector has to re-fetch files it has already processed.</p>

<p>RubyGems added <a href="https://guides.rubygems.org/trusted-publishing/">trusted publishing</a> for GitHub Actions in December 2023 and <a href="https://github.com/rubygems/rubygems.org/pull/4987">server support for Sigstore attestations</a> in November 2024. Attestations are uploaded with <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">gem push --attestation</code>, or through the <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">rubygems/release-gem</code> action, where the input is labelled experimental, and they are served as Sigstore bundles from <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">/api/v1/attestations/&lt;name&gt;-&lt;version&gt;.json</code>. <a href="https://github.com/ruby/rubygems/pull/9325">Automatic attestation in <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">gem push</code></a>, limited to GitHub Actions publishing to rubygems.org, was merged in April 2026 and ships in the RubyGems 4.1 line.</p>

<p>RubyGems also has an older <a href="https://guides.rubygems.org/security/">X.509 signing scheme</a> through <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">gem cert</code>, which the guide describes as rarely used, and <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">gem install</code> checks those signatures when a trust policy is passed with <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">-P</code>.</p>

<p><a href="https://jsr.io/docs/trust">JSR</a> has had OIDC publishing from GitHub Actions since its <a href="https://deno.com/blog/jsr_open_beta">open beta</a> in March 2024, and publishes from Actions get SLSA provenance recorded in Rekor automatically, with <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">--no-provenance</code> as the opt-out. <a href="https://central.sonatype.org/news/20250128_sigstore_signature_validation_via_portal/">Maven Central</a> has validated optional <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">.sigstore.json</code> files since January 2025, with an invalid one producing a warning, and Sonatype states that PGP remains the required signature.</p>

<p>conda’s <a href="https://github.com/conda/ceps/pull/112">CEP 27</a>, accepted in July 2025, defines a publish predicate in a Sigstore bundle, and <a href="https://github.com/conda/ceps/pull/142">CEP 50</a>, accepted in September 2026, specifies serving attestations as <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">.sigs</code> sidecar files next to each package, listed through an <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">attestations_sha256</code> field in repodata. <a href="https://prefix.dev/blog/securing-the-conda-package-supply-chain-with-sigstore">prefix.dev</a> has generated CEP 27 attestations since August 2025 for packages uploaded through trusted publishing from GitHub Actions, GitLab CI/CD or Google Cloud.</p>

<p>conda-forge’s own channel uses neither signing nor trusted publishing: builds upload to a staging channel with a per-feedstock token and are copied to <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">conda-forge</code> after an <a href="https://conda-forge.org/docs/maintainer/infrastructure/">output check</a>, and the September 2025 core meeting minutes report little progress on signing. The conda client <a href="https://github.com/conda/conda/blob/main/conda/gateways/connection/download.py">checks each download</a> against the SHA-256 and size in repodata and fails on a mismatch. <a href="https://github.com/conda/rattler/pull/2795">rattler</a> added opt-in Sigstore verification at install time in September 2026, and conda has <a href="https://github.com/conda/conda/issues/13965">open issues</a> requesting install-time verification.</p>

<p>In each of these clients verification is a separate step from installing: npm ships <a href="https://docs.npmjs.com/verifying-registry-signatures"><code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">npm audit signatures</code></a>, which checks registry signatures and provenance as its own command. For Python, open issues on <a href="https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/13531">pip</a> (the <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">attestation-identities</code> field in PEP 751 lockfiles) and <a href="https://github.com/astral-sh/uv/issues/9122">uv</a> (PEP 740) track install-time checks, and PyPI’s documentation recommends the <a href="https://docs.pypi.org/attestations/consuming-attestations/"><code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">pypi-attestations</code></a> CLI for manual checks.</p>

<h2 id="identity">Identity</h2>

<p>Checking the signature on an attestation shows that it was signed with a key certified by Sigstore. Checking that the certificate belongs to the repository you expected is a second step, and both <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">gh</code> and <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">pypi-attestations</code> require the user to supply that repository: <a href="https://cli.github.com/manual/gh_attestation_verify"><code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">gh attestation verify</code></a> takes <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">--owner</code> or <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">--repo</code> and <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">pypi-attestations verify pypi</code> takes <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">--repository</code> on every call, and each compares the value with the repository in the signing certificate. <a href="https://peps.python.org/pep-0751/">PEP 751</a> lockfiles can record the expected identity once per package in <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">attestation-identities</code>, which is the field the open pip issue asks installs to be checked against.</p>

<h2 id="keys">Keys</h2>

<p>npm has signed every package with an ECDSA <a href="https://docs.npmjs.com/about-registry-signatures">registry key</a> since April 2023, when it deprecated its PGP signatures, with signatures in <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">dist.signatures</code> and public keys at <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">/-/npm/v1/keys</code>. <a href="https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/nuget/reference/signed-packages-reference">NuGet.org</a> repository-signs every package and accepts optional author signatures from X.509 certificates issued by a CA in the Windows root store. The dotnet client <a href="https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/core/tools/nuget-signed-package-verification">checks those signatures during restore</a> by default: always on Windows, and on Linux since the .NET 8 SDK, with macOS left off. NuGet added <a href="https://devblogs.microsoft.com/dotnet/enhanced-security-is-here-with-the-new-trust-publishing-on-nuget-org/">trusted publishing</a> for GitHub Actions in September 2025, with GitLab supported through the <a href="https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/nuget/nuget-org/trusted-publishing">token API</a>, and its artifact-level evidence is limited to signatures.</p>

<p>Maven Central <a href="https://central.sonatype.org/publish/requirements/gpg/">requires</a> a PGP <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">.asc</code> signature on every published file, along with MD5 and SHA-1 checksums. Maven checks those signatures during dependency resolution when a plugin such as <a href="https://www.simplify4u.org/pgpverify-maven-plugin/">pgpverify-maven-plugin</a> is added. A PGP signature identifies the uploader’s key and carries no record of the source the file was built from, and Central has no trusted publishing to supply one.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.com/clojars/clojars-web/wiki/Pushing">Clojars</a> accepts optional PGP <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">.asc</code> or SSH <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">.sig</code> files and requires that if any artifact in a deploy is signed, all of them are, but it skips checking the signatures against a key. Leiningen fails on a checksum mismatch by default and checks PGP signatures through <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">lein deps :verify</code>, while tools.deps warns on a mismatch and skips signature checks.</p>

<p>The <a href="https://developer.hashicorp.com/terraform/registry/providers/publishing">Terraform Registry</a> requires providers to publish a GPG signature over a <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">SHA256SUMS</code> file, from a key uploaded to the registry, and <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">terraform init</code> checks it by default and reports whether the signing key belongs to HashiCorp, a HashiCorp partner, or a community publisher. Terraform modules are published unsigned from git tags through a webhook.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.com/eclipse-openvsx/openvsx/issues/543">Open VSX</a> signs every extension with a registry key, and its version API returns the signature, a SHA-256 and the public key URL. <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">verify</code> commands were added to the <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">ovsx</code> CLI in September 2026. Checking those signatures at install is up to each editor build, and Arch’s Code - OSS package has <a href="https://github.com/eclipse-openvsx/openvsx/issues/1247">failed to verify them</a>. Open VSX shipped <a href="https://github.com/eclipse-openvsx/openvsx/pull/2000">trusted publishing</a> for GitHub Actions and GitLab CI in server v1.2.0 in September 2026, which sets a <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">publishedWithTrustedPublishing</code> flag on the version. v1.3.0, still pending deployment on open-vsx.org, <a href="https://github.com/eclipse-openvsx/openvsx/pull/2283">records the CI run</a> on each upload.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.com/hexpm/specifications/blob/main/registry-v2.md">Hex</a> signs all registry resources with the repository’s RSA key, and the <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">hex_core</code> client verifies those signatures on every fetch. Hex added <a href="https://hex.pm/docs/workload-identity">Workload Identity</a>, its name for trusted publishing, in October 2026. A GitHub Actions job exchanges an OIDC token for a 15-minute key scoped to one package, and the verified claims are stored unsigned on the release and shown on the package page as a “Provenance” card. SLSA provenance and Sigstore are on the <a href="https://security.erlef.org/aegis/roadmap/hex-build-provenance">Erlang Ecosystem Foundation’s roadmap</a> as unfunded work.</p>

<p>CPAN’s per-author <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">CHECKSUMS</code> files are PGP-signed and include SHA-256 hashes, and authors can sign distributions with Module::Signature. <a href="https://fastapi.metacpan.org/v1/pod/CPAN?content-type=text/plain">CPAN.pm</a> and <a href="https://fastapi.metacpan.org/v1/pod/App::cpanminus?content-type=text/plain">cpanm</a> both check signatures only when the user opts in.</p>

<p>Swift’s package registry protocol has supported <a href="https://github.com/swiftlang/swift-evolution/blob/main/proposals/0391-package-registry-publish.md">CMS signing</a> since Swift 5.9. SwiftPM sets <a href="https://github.com/swiftlang/swift-package-manager/blob/main/Documentation/PackageRegistry/PackageRegistryUsage.md">checksum pinning</a> to <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">strict</code> by default and <a href="https://github.com/swiftlang/swift-package-manager/blob/main/Documentation/PackageRegistry/PackageRegistryUsage.md#validating-signed-packages">validates signed archives</a> against its trust store. The <a href="https://swiftpackageindex.com/">Swift Package Index</a> lists git repository URLs, and SwiftPM fetches those packages by cloning, so registry signing covers only packages installed from a registry.</p>

<p><a href="https://well-typed.com/blog/2015/07/hackage-security-alpha">Hackage</a> signs its index with TUF through hackage-security, and hashes in the signed index cover package tarballs. cabal-install <a href="https://github.com/haskell/cabal/blob/master/cabal-install/src/Distribution/Client/Config.hs">enables the check</a> by default for hackage.haskell.org.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.com/repository-service-tuf">Repository Service for TUF</a> (RSTUF) is software a registry can deploy to sign and republish its index on a schedule. Zach Steindler’s FOSDEM talk noted that RSTUF’s output is not yet verified in a normal production install workflow.</p>

<h2 id="checksums">Checksums</h2>

<p>Go has had the <a href="https://go.dev/blog/module-mirror-launch">checksum database</a> at sum.golang.org on by default since Go 1.13 in 2019. It is a transparency log of module hashes, so every client gets the same bytes for a given version, and it can be bypassed per path with <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">GOPRIVATE</code> or <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">GONOSUMDB</code>. A Go module version is a git tag pushed to the source repository, so the checksum database is the only signed record.</p>

<p>crates.io records a SHA-256 of each <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">.crate</code> in the <a href="https://doc.rust-lang.org/cargo/reference/registry-index.html">index</a> and Cargo rejects a download with a different hash, but the index itself is unsigned. A <a href="https://github.com/rust-lang/rfcs/pull/3403">Sigstore RFC</a> was closed and a <a href="https://github.com/rust-lang/rfcs/pull/3724">TUF RFC</a> has been open since October 2024. crates.io shipped <a href="https://blog.rust-lang.org/2025/07/11/crates-io-development-update-2025-07/">trusted publishing</a> for GitHub Actions in July 2025 and <a href="https://blog.rust-lang.org/2026/01/21/crates-io-development-update/">added GitLab</a> in January 2026, along with a per-crate setting to disable token publishing.</p>

<p>Julia’s General registry stores a content-addressed <a href="https://github.com/JuliaLang/Pkg.jl/blob/master/docs/src/protocol.md">git tree hash</a> per version as its only integrity check. CRAN’s <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">PACKAGES</code> file lists an MD5 for each package, which <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">install.packages</code> ignores when downloading. R 4.6.0, released in April 2026, added optional package signing: a package can ship a <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">SHA256</code> file with a detached GnuPG signature, which <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">R CMD INSTALL</code> checks when present and requires when <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">_R_INSTALL_REQUIRE_SIGNED</code> is set, and otherwise uses the unsigned hash files inside the tarball.</p>

<h2 id="caches">Caches</h2>

<p>Nix, Guix and Spack build packages from source on project infrastructure and sign the binary caches they serve, as Debian and Fedora do. Each client checks those signatures by default. On cache.nixos.org each <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">.narinfo</code> carries an Ed25519 signature over the store path, its hash and its references. Nix’s <a href="https://nix.dev/manual/nix/latest/command-ref/conf-file.html"><code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">require-sigs</code></a> defaults to true, and the default <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">trusted-public-keys</code> includes the cache.nixos.org key.</p>

<p>Guix rejects substitutes that are unsigned or signed by a key outside its ACL, and since 1.2.0 in 2020 <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">guix pull</code> authenticates every channel commit against the OpenPGP keys listed in the parent commit’s <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">.guix-authorizations</code> file, the same check <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">guix git authenticate</code> applies to any repository. Spack signs build cache manifests with GPG and verifies them on install by default, with <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">--no-check-signature</code> and <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">--unsigned</code> as opt-outs, though <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">spack buildcache keys --install --trust</code> installs and trusts every key the mirror serves. Nix has an open <a href="https://github.com/NixOS/nix/issues/7216">Sigstore issue</a> and a <a href="https://github.com/NixOS/nix/pull/11749">provenance tracking PR</a>, the only build provenance proposals across the three.</p>

<h2 id="retired">Retired</h2>

<p>Anaconda’s TUF-based <a href="https://www.anaconda.com/blog/conda-signature-verification">conda-content-trust</a>, available since 2021, reached end of support in September 2026. Docker <a href="https://www.docker.com/blog/retiring-docker-content-trust/">announced the retirement</a> of Docker Content Trust in July 2025, and the Notary v1 server at notary.docker.io <a href="https://www.docker.com/blog/docker-content-trust-retirement-and-migration-guidance/">shuts down</a> on 8 December 2026, with cosign and Notation named as replacements for publishers. Docker Hardened Images are <a href="https://docs.docker.com/dhi/core-concepts/signatures/">signed with cosign</a> and carry provenance, SBOM and VEX attestations.</p>

<h2 id="unsigned">Unsigned</h2>

<p><a href="https://dart.dev/tools/pub/automated-publishing">pub.dev</a> has accepted OIDC publishing from GitHub Actions and Google Cloud since January 2023 and its audit log records the CI run that published each version. packagist.org offers neither signing nor trusted publishing, and since July 2026 each stable version has been <a href="https://blog.packagist.com/immutable-versions-on-packagist/">fixed to a commit</a>, though GitHub generates the dist zips on request. A <a href="https://blog.packagist.com/strengthening-php-supply-chain-security-with-a-transparency-log-for-packagist-org/">transparency log</a> for security events is in progress. The <a href="https://blog.packagist.com/an-update-on-composer-packagist-supply-chain-security/">undated longer-term plan</a> is hosted artifacts with SLSA provenance and Sigstore attestations that Composer verifies. CocoaPods uses git for integrity, and trunk <a href="https://blog.cocoapods.org/CocoaPods-Specs-Repo/">stops accepting</a> new podspecs on 2 December 2026.</p>

<h2 id="forges">Forges</h2>

<p>The forge is the identity provider that registries accept for trusted publishing, and for git-based registries like Homebrew it is also where attestations are stored. GitHub <a href="https://docs.github.com/en/actions/concepts/security/artifact-attestations">artifact attestations</a> went <a href="https://github.blog/changelog/2024-06-25-artifact-attestations-is-generally-available/">GA</a> in June 2024. Attestations for public repositories are signed through Sigstore’s public-good instance and logged in Rekor, while private repositories use GitHub’s own instance with no transparency log. A <a href="https://docs.github.com/en/rest/repos/attestations">REST API</a> lists attestations by subject digest with a <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">predicate_type</code> filter.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.blog/changelog/2025-10-28-immutable-releases-are-now-generally-available/">Immutable releases</a>, GA since October 2025, add a release attestation with its own in-toto predicate, checked with <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">gh release verify</code>. Actions themselves are repositories referenced by tag or SHA, with no signature. Immutable Actions, which would have published actions as OCI packages with provenance, was <a href="https://github.com/github/roadmap/issues/592">removed from the roadmap</a> in December 2025. The <a href="https://github.blog/changelog/2026-10-14-github-actions-workflow-lockfiles-in-public-preview/">workflow lockfiles</a> that entered public preview in October 2026 pin direct and transitive actions to commits without integrity hashes.</p>

<p>Homebrew has attached GitHub attestations to homebrew-core bottles <a href="https://blog.trailofbits.com/2024/05/14/a-peek-into-build-provenance-for-homebrew/">since May 2024</a>, and verifying them is opt-in with <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">HOMEBREW_VERIFY_ATTESTATIONS</code>, which shells out to <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">gh</code>. <a href="/2026/04/07/who-built-this.html">Who Built This?</a> traces an attestation like these from a package back to its commit, and <a href="/2026/02/24/reproducible-builds-in-language-package-managers.html">Reproducible Builds in Language Package Managers</a> covers checking the artifact by rebuilding it.</p>

<p>GitLab’s <a href="https://docs.gitlab.com/ci/pipeline_security/slsa/level_3/">SLSA Level 3 provenance</a> was introduced as an experiment in GitLab 18.3 and is still marked experimental, available to public projects on GitLab.com Ultimate behind the <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">slsa_provenance_statement</code> feature flag. Attestations are listed per project and subject digest through the <a href="https://docs.gitlab.com/api/attestations/">attestations API</a> and checked with <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">glab attestation verify</code>. As an OIDC issuer, GitLab is accepted for trusted publishing by npm, PyPI, crates.io, NuGet, Open VSX and prefix.dev.</p>

<p>Forgejo v15, released in April 2026 and run by Codeberg, added <a href="https://forgejo.org/2026-04-release-v15-0">OIDC ID tokens for Actions</a>, and registries have yet to accept it as a trusted publisher. PyPI has a <a href="https://discuss.python.org/t/new-oidc-providers-for-trusted-publishing/106334">discussion thread</a> and crates.io has named it as a possibility. Gitea <a href="https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/39052">merged the equivalent</a> in October 2026 for its unreleased 29.0 release. Bitbucket Pipelines issues OIDC tokens, and a <a href="https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/BCLOUD-23917">request</a> for npm trusted publishing from Pipelines is open on Atlassian’s Bitbucket Cloud tracker with the status Gathering Interest.</p>

<p>Gitea, Forgejo, Bitbucket Cloud, Gerrit and Tangled have no dedicated attestation endpoint. <a href="https://docs.frem.sh/security/immutable-releases/">fremforge</a>, a Forgejo-based service, has a release attestation endpoint that returns DSSE envelopes and Sigstore bundles.</p>

<h2 id="summary">Summary</h2>

<p>In the “signature checked by default” column, Go’s checksum log and Hackage’s TUF index sign the metadata that holds the hashes, so the go command and cabal-install authenticate the hashes as well as the downloads. Cargo, Julia’s Pkg and conda check downloads against hashes in metadata served over TLS without a signature. That catches corruption, but the hashes are only as trustworthy as the registry serving them.</p>

<table>
  <thead>
    <tr>
      <th> </th>
      <th>signatures</th>
      <th>provenance attestations</th>
      <th>trusted publishing</th>
      <th>signature checked by default</th>
      <th>attestation checked by default</th>
    </tr>
  </thead>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>npm</td>
      <td>registry ECDSA</td>
      <td>SLSA + npm publish, Sigstore</td>
      <td>GitHub, GitLab, CircleCI</td>
      <td>no; <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">npm audit signatures</code></td>
      <td>no; <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">npm audit signatures</code></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>PyPI</td>
      <td>PGP removed 2023</td>
      <td>PEP 740 publish</td>
      <td>GitHub, GitLab, Google Cloud, ActiveState</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
      <td>no; <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">pypi-attestations</code></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>RubyGems</td>
      <td>optional X.509</td>
      <td>Sigstore</td>
      <td>GitHub</td>
      <td>opt-in (<code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">-P</code>)</td>
      <td>no</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>JSR</td>
      <td>none</td>
      <td>SLSA, Sigstore</td>
      <td>GitHub</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
      <td>no</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Maven Central</td>
      <td>PGP required</td>
      <td>optional <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">.sigstore.json</code></td>
      <td>no</td>
      <td>plugin</td>
      <td>no</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>prefix.dev</td>
      <td>none</td>
      <td>Sigstore (CEP 27)</td>
      <td>GitHub, GitLab, Google Cloud</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
      <td>opt-in (rattler)</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>conda-forge</td>
      <td>none</td>
      <td>none</td>
      <td>no</td>
      <td>n/a; repodata checksum</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>NuGet</td>
      <td>repository + optional author</td>
      <td>none</td>
      <td>GitHub, GitLab</td>
      <td>Windows, Linux</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Clojars</td>
      <td>optional PGP/SSH, not verified</td>
      <td>none</td>
      <td>no</td>
      <td>opt-in (Leiningen); checksum</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Terraform Registry</td>
      <td>GPG required for providers</td>
      <td>none</td>
      <td>no</td>
      <td>yes, providers</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Open VSX</td>
      <td>registry key</td>
      <td>none</td>
      <td>GitHub, GitLab</td>
      <td>depends on editor</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Hex.pm</td>
      <td>registry RSA</td>
      <td>planned</td>
      <td>GitHub</td>
      <td>yes</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>CPAN</td>
      <td>PGP CHECKSUMS, optional author</td>
      <td>none</td>
      <td>no</td>
      <td>opt-in</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Swift registries</td>
      <td>CMS</td>
      <td>none</td>
      <td>no</td>
      <td>yes; checksum pinning</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Hackage</td>
      <td>TUF index</td>
      <td>none</td>
      <td>no</td>
      <td>yes, TUF</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Go</td>
      <td>signed checksum log</td>
      <td>none</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
      <td>yes, checksum DB</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>crates.io</td>
      <td>none</td>
      <td>none</td>
      <td>GitHub, GitLab</td>
      <td>n/a; index checksum</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Julia General</td>
      <td>none</td>
      <td>none</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
      <td>n/a; tree hash</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>CRAN</td>
      <td>optional GnuPG (R 4.6)</td>
      <td>none</td>
      <td>no</td>
      <td>if present</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>nixpkgs</td>
      <td>Ed25519 cache signatures</td>
      <td>none</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
      <td>yes</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Guix</td>
      <td>substitutes + signed commits</td>
      <td>none</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
      <td>yes</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Spack</td>
      <td>GPG build cache</td>
      <td>none</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
      <td>yes</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Docker Hub</td>
      <td>DCT, retiring Dec 2026</td>
      <td>Hardened Images only</td>
      <td>no</td>
      <td>no</td>
      <td>no</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>pub.dev</td>
      <td>none</td>
      <td>none</td>
      <td>GitHub, Google Cloud</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Packagist</td>
      <td>none</td>
      <td>planned</td>
      <td>planned</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>CocoaPods</td>
      <td>none</td>
      <td>none</td>
      <td>no</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>GitHub Actions</td>
      <td>none</td>
      <td>immutable releases only</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
      <td>no</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Homebrew</td>
      <td>none</td>
      <td>GitHub attestations</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
      <td>n/a</td>
      <td>opt-in</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>]]></content><author><name>Andrew Nesbitt</name><email>andrew@ecosyste.ms</email></author><category term="package-managers" /><category term="security" /><category term="registries" /><category term="deep-dive" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[A survey of signing, provenance attestations and trusted publishing across package registries.]]></summary><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://nesbitt.io/images/boxes.png" /><media:content medium="image" url="https://nesbitt.io/images/boxes.png" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" /></entry><entry><title type="html">This Week in Source Control: 28 October 2026</title><link href="https://nesbitt.io/2026/10/28/this-week-in-source-control.html" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="This Week in Source Control: 28 October 2026" /><published>2026-10-28T10:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2026-10-28T10:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://nesbitt.io/2026/10/28/this-week-in-source-control</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://nesbitt.io/2026/10/28/this-week-in-source-control.html"><![CDATA[<p>Alongside package management, I follow new features and security fixes in source control clients and in the forges that host repositories, since a lot of what I build, like <a href="https://github.com/git-pkgs">git-pkgs</a>, reads git repositories and calls forge APIs. <a href="/2026/10/24/this-week-in-package-management.html">This Week in Package Management</a> has been published every Saturday since May, and I kept putting git releases and forge news in its Elsewhere section.</p>

<p>Starting this week, I’m publishing that material as a separate roundup on Wednesdays. It covers clients like git, jj, gitoxide, Sapling, Mercurial and Git LFS, and forges like GitHub, GitLab, Forgejo, Gitea, Codeberg, sourcehut, Radicle and Tangled. Package managers resolving git dependencies and CI systems like GitHub Actions are covered in the Saturday post.</p>

<p>This first issue covers the fortnight since 11 October, with links from release feeds for those tools and forges, the <a href="https://lobste.rs/t/vcs">Lobsters vcs tag</a>, Hacker News and my boosts on <a href="https://mastodon.social/@andrewnez">Mastodon</a>. In that fortnight Anthropic, GitHub, Entire and Enroute each published a post about rebuilding source control or git hosting for the volume of pushes and checkouts from coding agents.</p>

<h2 id="scaling">Scaling</h2>

<p><a href="https://www.anthropic.com/engineering/redesigning-source-control">Redesigning source control at Anthropic</a> (Anthropic Engineering) describes Scion, an in-house version control system that replaced git for the company’s monorepo in five months. Merges went from around 2,500 a day in May to over 30,000 a day in September. The main branch history is almost 100 GB, and CI performs around 25 million checkouts a day. Scion is designed for clients that are always online. The server stores changesets in a write-ahead log on Spanner and runs blame, history and merge queries server-side, and clients fetch only the trees and blobs they request through regional caches. Anthropic reports the new infrastructure uses 200x less CPU and memory than the git mirror fleet it replaced. In <a href="https://simonwillison.net/2026/Oct/13/redesigning-source-control-at-anthropic/">notes on the post</a>, Simon Willison compares it to centralised systems like Subversion.</p>

<p><a href="https://sunshowers.io/posts/anthropic-mononoke/">Anthropic’s Scion is heavily inspired by Mononoke</a> (sunshowers) points out that Scion’s “derived data” for fast blame and history queries matches the design of Mononoke, the server side of Meta’s Sapling. The original post credited Sapling only for “hard-won lessons”. <a href="https://sunshowers.io/posts/anthropic-mononoke-2/">A follow-up</a> compares Scion’s changesets with Mononoke’s Bonsai changesets. Anthropic has since updated its post with more detail on the projects Scion is based on.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.blog/engineering/architecture-optimization/the-bridge-to-agent-scale-git-infrastructure/">The bridge to agent-scale Git infrastructure</a> (Eleanor White and Victoria Dye, GitHub Blog) covers the move of GitHub’s repositories to Azure. Most repositories have two of their five replicas there, and Azure serves about half of Git traffic. Moving the busiest repositories was blocked by a repository-wide lock that every write held across a 25ms cross-region round trip. Spokes is switching to per-reference serialisation, so only writes to the same ref wait for each other, which gave 3-4x write throughput in internal tests. Object storage then joins the write quorum as a “virtual replica”, so read replicas can be stateless.</p>

<p><a href="https://entire.com/blog/the-git-forge-for-agent-human-collaboration">Entire</a>, a new git forge from a company co-founded by former GitHub CEO Thomas Dohmke, is built for repositories where coding agents and people push to the same branches. Its git server replicates each repository across regions, and the company’s <a href="https://github.com/entireio/forgemark">forgemark</a> benchmark reports pushes up to 89x faster than GitHub and 6x faster than Cursor Origin. Review happens through Trails, which run configured checks and agent-run evaluations in Daytona or E2B sandboxes on every push instead of a pull request diff. Agent sessions and prompts are synced into the repository and indexed for later agents to search.</p>

<p><a href="https://enroute.sh/blog/everyone-is-doing-git-on-s3-wrong">Everyone is doing Git on S3 wrong</a> (Enroute) looks at the write-ahead log designs for git on object storage that followed Cursor’s Continuity. Those designs send every push to a repository through one primary, and every replica keeps a full copy of the repository on disk. Enroute keeps each repository’s refs and a list of immutable object layers in a Raft-replicated log. Packfiles are rewritten on ingestion so a read from object storage needs only a few requests, and Enroute reports more than 7,600 pushes per second into a single repository. Against stock git serving a repacked linux.git, full clones are about 17% slower and shallow clones more than twice as fast.</p>

<h2 id="releases">Releases</h2>

<p><a href="https://docs.gitlab.com/releases/19/gitlab-19-5-released/">GitLab 19.5</a> makes the GitLab MCP server and GitLab Secrets Manager, built on OpenBao, generally available. Smaller changes include a commit count variable for commit message templates, and commits signed by revoked GPG identities now show as unverified.</p>

<p><a href="https://forgejo.org/2026-10-release-v17-0/">Forgejo 17.0</a> resolves absolute links in rendered documents against the repository root, as other forges do, and deprecates action run webhook events in favour of workflow run events. It also adds a Donate button driven by <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">FUNDING.yml</code>, migration from Bitbucket Data Center, and opt-in invitations for organisation membership. <a href="https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/src/branch/forgejo/release-notes-published/17.0.1.md">Forgejo 17.0.1, 16.0.7 and 15.0.11</a> followed on 26 October as security releases. The main fix stops a <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">pull_request_review</code> event running an Actions workflow as trusted from an arbitrary commit, including one from a fork, by ignoring the unvalidated <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">commit_id</code> on the submitted review. 17.0.1 also carries bug fixes for 17.0.0, which the project had <a href="https://floss.social/@forgejo/117450533397721524">advised holding off from</a> after reports of blocked pushes and merges.</p>

<p><a href="https://gitroot.dev/blog/version-0.5.0.html">GitRoot 0.5.0</a>, a self-hosted forge with no database that is extended through WASM plugins, now references plugins by PURL with a checksum qualifier in place of separate URL, checksum and version fields. New per-forge and per-repository settings cap how many branches anonymous users can push before further anonymous pushes are rejected.</p>

<p><a href="https://pushin.eu">Pushin.eu</a>, an invite-only forge hosted in the EU, shipped several releases this fortnight according to its <a href="https://pushin.eu/pjullrich/pushin/changelog">changelog</a>. 0.3.26 adds tag-based releases with a GitHub-compatible API and GoReleaser publishing, and 0.3.29 serves public repository files from <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">raw.pushin.eu</code>. 0.3.32 adds runner groups for self-hosted runners and removes the per-repository <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">allow_persistent_runners</code> setting.</p>

<p><a href="https://forges.link/">forges</a> (Daniel Roe) is a TypeScript version of my Go library <a href="https://github.com/git-pkgs/forge">git-pkgs/forge</a>, with one interface for issues, pull requests, notifications, checks and webhooks across GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, Forgejo, Gitea, Gitee, Azure DevOps, Cursor Origin, Tangled, Pushin.eu and Sourcehut. Each provider declares which operations it supports, and the release notes show the capability changes per forge. <a href="https://github.com/danielroe/forges/releases/tag/v0.1.0">0.1.0</a> came out on 11 October, and <a href="https://github.com/danielroe/forges/releases/tag/v0.3.0">0.3.0</a> adds branch rules and review threads.</p>

<p><a href="https://blog.gitea.com/release-of-gitea-cli-0.1.0/">gt 0.1.0</a> replaces <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">tea</code>, Gitea’s command line tool, with a rewrite under a new name and repository. Every list and view command supports <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">--json</code> and <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">--jq</code>, and <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">gt pr checkout</code> and <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">gt pr diff</code> handle fork and AGit pull requests. It requires Gitea 28 or newer.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.com/GitoxideLabs/gitoxide/releases/tag/v0.61.0">gitoxide 0.61.0</a> moves the plumbing crates to a standard <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">std::error::Error</code> compatible error type and improves tracing across commands, along with security fixes.</p>

<h2 id="security">Security</h2>

<p><a href="https://github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/releases/tag/v3.8.1">Git LFS 3.8.1</a> fixes four CVEs:</p>

<ul>
  <li>unquoted arguments in remote commands sent over SSH</li>
  <li>Cookie headers forwarded to other hosts after a redirect</li>
  <li>an arbitrary program run from a malicious repository through line feeds in a submodule URL</li>
  <li>an arbitrary program run from a malicious repository through a custom transfer adapter set in <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">.lfsconfig</code></li>
</ul>

<p>GitLab shipped two critical patch releases for integer overflows in its regular expression compiler that allowed unauthenticated code execution. The <a href="https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/gitlab-warns-of-max-severity-rce-flaw-in-regex-compiler-engine/">first, on 12 October</a>, fixed CVE-2026-97229 in CI configuration patterns, and a <a href="https://docs.gitlab.com/releases/patches/patch-release-gitlab-19-5-1-released/">21 October release</a> fixed CVE-2026-110264, which affects every version from 7.0 and was backported as far as 18.11.13. The underlying bugs are in Ruby’s Onigmo, whose fixes were in <a href="/2026/10/24/this-week-in-package-management.html">last week’s package management roundup</a>.</p>

<p><a href="https://blog.gitea.com/release-of-28.2.0/">Gitea 28.2.0</a> discloses 13 CVEs, two of them fixed in earlier releases. One fix limits which stored public keys an SSH certificate principal is matched against. Before the fix, matching against every stored key let a certificate authenticate as a different user.</p>

<p><a href="https://git-annex.branchable.com/security/cross_repository_data_exfiltration_via_special_remote/">git-annex 10.20261026</a> fixes CVE-2026-112818, a cross-repository exfiltration attack found by Joey Hess. A repository the victim clones can autoenable a special remote that points at the victim’s own private git-annex storage, so a later <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">git-annex sync --content</code> reads the private files and sends them to the attacker. After the fix, <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">enableremote</code> requires the special remote’s configuration to be verified, and git-annex refuses to send content to an unverified autoenabled remote.</p>

<p><a href="https://www.wiz.io/blog/gheist-attempted-scaled-abuse-of-stolen-github-tokens-stumbles">Gheist</a> (Rami McCarthy and Hila Ramati, Wiz) is a campaign that used stolen GitHub tokens to push a workflow to every reachable repository. The workflow writes repository secrets to its log in base32 so GitHub’s masking leaves them unredacted, and the attacker’s tool fetches the log over the API and deletes the run seconds later. GitHub’s hold on potentially malicious workflows in public repositories, in place since 28 July, blocked the payload there. Private repositories and GitHub Enterprise Server fall outside that hold, and Wiz observed successful runs and follow-on AWS activity from those.</p>

<p>An attacker took over a developer’s GitHub account and <a href="https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ovhcloud-cli-releases-backdoored-on-github-to-steal-developer-secrets/">replaced OVHcloud CLI releases 0.11.0 to 0.15.0</a> with builds that read secrets from disk. Release immutability was turned off on the repository, so the attacker could overwrite the existing releases directly and skip CI.</p>

<h2 id="github">GitHub</h2>

<p><a href="https://github.blog/changelog/2026-10-12-push-attribution-public-preview">Push attribution</a>, in limited preview for Enterprise customers, records the authenticated user who pushed each commit alongside the author and committer fields. A new “Committer must match pusher” ruleset condition accepts a push only when the committer matches one of the pusher’s verified email addresses.</p>

<p>During periods of unusual traffic, <a href="https://github.blog/changelog/2026-10-19-some-git-over-https-may-temporarily-require-authentication">unauthenticated HTTPS clones and fetches of public repositories may require authentication</a>, while SSH, authenticated HTTPS and pushes work as before.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.blog/changelog/2026-10-21-github-cli-opt-in-to-expiring-auto-refreshing-oauth-tokens">GitHub CLI 2.103.0</a> adds <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">gh auth login --expiring</code> for refreshable tokens that expire within hours. Used as a git credential helper, it requires git 2.46 or newer, which discards a cached credential when it expires.</p>

<p>Repositories can now <a href="https://github.blog/changelog/2026-10-20-bulk-migrate-branch-protections-to-rulesets-for-a-repository">convert all their branch protection rules to rulesets</a> in one step, with a preview before anything changes. A new <a href="https://github.blog/changelog/2026-10-13-github-app-improvements-for-least-privilege-and-management"><code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">repository_creation:write</code> permission</a> lets apps and fine-grained tokens create repositories with only that permission instead of full repository administration.</p>

<p>On the Files changed tab of a pull request, the <a href="https://github.blog/changelog/2026-10-22-pull-requests-saved-whitespace-preferences-and-improved-split-view">whitespace visibility setting can be saved</a> so it applies across pull requests, and new and deleted files now span both columns in split view.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.blog/changelog/2026-10-15-email-notifications-for-repository-push-events-have-been-retired">Email notifications for push events</a> have been retired because recipients could be added without consenting.</p>

<h2 id="elsewhere">Elsewhere</h2>

<p><a href="https://try.haxy.net/haxy:haxy">Haxy</a>, now in preview, is a local-first forge written in Zig that stores issues, pull requests and discussions as events on a <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">haxy/events</code> branch and serves a TUI over SSH alongside its web interface.</p>

<p><a href="https://offby1.website/posts/making-git-hooks-visible-in-fish-shell.html">Making git hooks visible in fish shell</a> (Chris R) ports Ned Batchelder’s zsh function, which lists a repository’s executable hooks when you <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">cd</code> into it, after Frank Wiles nearly fell for an attack hidden in a shared hooks folder.</p>

<p>jwz has created <a href="https://github.com/xscreensaver-official/xscreensaver">a GitHub repository</a> whose only content is a README stating that XScreenSaver releases are published only as tarballs on the XScreenSaver website and that other repositories are unofficial.</p>

<p>Send links for next week to <a href="https://mastodon.social/@andrewnez">@andrewnez@mastodon.social</a>.</p>]]></content><author><name>Andrew Nesbitt</name><email>andrew@ecosyste.ms</email></author><category term="git" /><category term="weekly" /><category term="twisc" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[Releases, advisories, and articles from across version control and forges]]></summary><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://nesbitt.io/images/boxes.png" /><media:content medium="image" url="https://nesbitt.io/images/boxes.png" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" /></entry><entry><title type="html">Package Management Devroom at FOSDEM 2027: Call for Participation</title><link href="https://nesbitt.io/2026/10/26/package-management-devroom-at-fosdem-2027-call-for-participation.html" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Package Management Devroom at FOSDEM 2027: Call for Participation" /><published>2026-10-26T10:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2026-10-26T10:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://nesbitt.io/2026/10/26/package-management-devroom-at-fosdem-2027-call-for-participation</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://nesbitt.io/2026/10/26/package-management-devroom-at-fosdem-2027-call-for-participation.html"><![CDATA[<p><em>Cross-posted from the <a href="https://stewardshiplab.org/ideas/cfp-package-management-devroom-at-fosdem-27/">Software Stewardship Lab</a>.</em></p>

<p>The Package Management devroom is back at FOSDEM 2027, on Sunday 31 January from 13:15 to 17:00 at the Université libre de Bruxelles. The call for participation is open and submissions close on 1 December at 23:59 UTC, through <a href="https://pretalx.fosdem.org/fosdem-2027/cfp">pretalx</a>.</p>

<p>Wolf Vollprecht and I ran the devroom at FOSDEM 2026 after putting out <a href="https://blog.ecosyste.ms/2025/11/06/fosdem-2026-package-managers-devroom-cfp.html">last year’s call for participation</a> on the Ecosystems blog. The devroom had nine talks, listed in the <a href="/2025/12/20/fosdem-2026-package-managers-devroom-schedule.html">schedule post</a> and written up alongside the rest of the weekend’s package management content in <a href="/2026/02/04/package-management-at-fosdem-2026.html">Package Management at FOSDEM 2026</a>. This year there are four of us, with Vlad Miricioiu from the Stewardship Lab, who spoke last year, and Travis Hathaway from Anaconda joining Wolf and me.</p>

<p>I’d happily take more talks like these from last year:</p>

<ul>
  <li>Matthew Suozzo showed how <a href="https://archive.fosdem.org/2026/schedule/event/EP8AMW-oss-rebuild-observability/">OSS Rebuild instruments</a> the build environment, with a transparent network proxy and an eBPF-based system analyzer, to catch suspicious behaviour that a reproducible build check would pass.</li>
  <li>Ryan Gibb presented the <a href="https://archive.fosdem.org/2026/schedule/event/3SANYS-package-managers-a-la-carte/">Package Calculus</a>, a formal model of dependency resolution that reduces the features of different package managers to one core calculus.</li>
  <li>Vlad Miricioiu covered <a href="https://archive.fosdem.org/2026/schedule/event/7NQJNU-binary_dependencies_identifying_the_hidden_packages_we_all_depend_on/">binary dependencies</a> that are missing from package manifests, like numpy’s reliance on OpenBLAS.</li>
  <li>Adam Harvey walked through the <a href="https://archive.fosdem.org/2026/schedule/event/GFA3RJ-a_phishy_case_study/">phishing campaign against crates.io owners</a> and how the Rust Project, Rust Foundation and Alpha-Omega shut it down.</li>
</ul>

<p>We want talks from package manager and registry maintainers on the problems they keep running into: dependency resolution, namespaces, signing, reproducibility, metadata standards, cross-ecosystem dependencies, and this year’s new supply chain attacks. We’d especially like talks on under-discussed parts of package management rather than more AI-augmented security tooling, and from people and communities underrepresented in free and open source software.</p>

<p>Pick “Package Management” as the track when you submit. Talks are 20 minutes by default, and if you’d prefer a 10 minute slot, say so in the “Submission Notes” field and we should be able to fit it in. Include a list of related previous work and a short bio for each speaker. Submitting means agreeing to the <a href="https://fosdem.org/2027/practical/conduct/">FOSDEM Code of Conduct</a>.</p>

<p>We’ll be in touch with selected speakers on 4 December, and the schedule will be published on 7 December. Send any questions about the devroom or your submission to <a href="mailto:package-management-devroom-manager@fosdem.org">package-management-devroom-manager@fosdem.org</a>.</p>]]></content><author><name>Andrew Nesbitt</name><email>andrew@ecosyste.ms</email></author><category term="package-managers" /><category term="fosdem" /><category term="conferences" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[Submissions close 1 December.]]></summary><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://nesbitt.io/images/boxes.png" /><media:content medium="image" url="https://nesbitt.io/images/boxes.png" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" /></entry><entry><title type="html">This Week in Package Management: 24 October 2026</title><link href="https://nesbitt.io/2026/10/24/this-week-in-package-management.html" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="This Week in Package Management: 24 October 2026" /><published>2026-10-24T10:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2026-10-24T10:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://nesbitt.io/2026/10/24/this-week-in-package-management</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://nesbitt.io/2026/10/24/this-week-in-package-management.html"><![CDATA[<p>This week’s package management news, and what a week it’s been, gathered from the <a href="https://github.com/ecosyste-ms/package-managers-opml">package manager OPML feed collection</a>, my posts and boosts on <a href="https://mastodon.social/@andrewnez">Mastodon</a>, and anything people sent me.</p>

<p>The compromised eMudhra intermediate CAs led to security releases from dozens of package managers, language runtimes and CA bundles this week.</p>

<h2 id="security">Security</h2>

<p>eMudhra generated eight of its intermediate CA certificates in a way that lets anyone <a href="https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/">recover their private keys</a>. Browsers blocked them through their revocation lists, and tools that bundle their own copy of the roots shipped new releases. I wrote about where those copies end up, and how many critical packages bundle a CA file, in <a href="/2026/10/21/trust-stores-are-dependencies-too.html">Trust Stores Are Dependencies Too</a>. The disclosure page keeps <a href="https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/#patched-os">a table of patched software</a> with version numbers, including ca-certificates updates for most Linux distributions and the BSDs. The package management releases with the fix:</p>

<ul>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/astral-sh/uv/releases/tag/0.13.4">uv 0.13.4</a> updates the roots compiled into uv, and <a href="https://github.com/astral-sh/uv/releases/tag/0.13.5">0.13.5</a> updates the managed CPython builds so their pip and <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">ensurepip</code> carry certifi 2026.10.19</li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/pypa/pip/releases/tag/26.2.2">pip 26.2.2</a></li>
  <li>Seth Larson’s <a href="https://discuss.python.org/t/information-for-python-users-regarding-emudhra-emsign-ca-certificate-security-incident/109576">notice for Python users</a> lists the minimum versions of certifi, pip, uv, sigstore, conda and pixi, and gives a hash-pinned command for upgrading pip from an affected environment</li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/conda/conda/releases/tag/26.9.4">conda 26.9.4</a> requires the updated certifi and ca-certificates, and the conda blog has <a href="https://conda.org/blog/2026-10-21-emudhra-security-updates">update instructions for conda, Mamba and Pixi</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/prefix-dev/pixi/releases/tag/v0.82.1">pixi 0.82.1</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://blog.rust-lang.org/2026/10/20/Rustup-1.29.2/">rustup 1.29.2</a></li>
  <li>Root bundles that other packages vendor: <a href="https://github.com/certifi/python-certifi/releases/tag/2026.10.19">certifi 2026.10.19</a>, <a href="https://github.com/rustls/webpki-roots/releases/tag/v%2F1.0.10">webpki-roots and webpki-root-certs 1.0.10</a>, <a href="https://github.com/rustls/webpki/releases/tag/v%2F0.103.16">rustls-webpki 0.103.16</a>, <a href="https://hex.pm/packages/castore/1.0.22">Elixir castore 1.0.22</a>, <a href="https://certifi.hexdocs.pm/2.18.0/changelog.html#2-18-0-2026-10-23">Erlang certifi 2.18.0</a>, <a href="https://metacpan.org/release/LWP/Mozilla-CA-20261020">Perl Mozilla::CA 20261020</a>, <a href="https://github.com/composer/ca-bundle/releases/tag/1.6.0">Composer ca-bundle 1.6.0 and 1.4.16</a> and the <a href="https://curl.se/docs/caextract.html">curl CA bundle</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/Homebrew/homebrew-core/blob/d02b8762f4a29859c47a635a0d2683223fea9812/Formula/c/ca-certificates.rb">Homebrew’s ca-certificates formula</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://blog.python.org/2026/10/python-3151-3149-31317/">Python 3.15.1, 3.14.9 and 3.13.17</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://openjdk.org/groups/vulnerability/advisories/2026-10-21">Java 27.0.1, 25.0.5, 21.0.13, 17.0.21, 11.0.33 and 8u511</a> for OpenJDK and Oracle JDK</li>
  <li><a href="https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/66pojueaQek/m/tmWX2Pq9AgAJ">Go 1.27.3 and 1.26.10</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/nodejs/node/releases/tag/v26.12.1">Node.js 26.12.1, 24.22.1 and 22.23.4</a> update the bundled root certificates to NSS 3.131.1 and fix ten CVEs, four of them rated high, including a Brotli decoder out-of-bounds write that can lead to remote code execution</li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/hexpm/hex/releases/tag/v2.5.4">Hex 2.5.4</a> removes three emSign roots from its bundled CA list</li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/composer/composer/releases/tag/2.11.0-RC1">Composer 2.11.0-RC1</a> rejects the intermediates even when the system CA store includes their roots</li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/denoland/deno/releases/tag/v2.9.8">Deno 2.9.8</a> and <a href="https://bun.com/blog/bun-v1.4.4">Bun 1.4.4</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/jdx/mise/releases/tag/v2026.10.17">mise 2026.10.17</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish/releases/tag/v1.14.3">pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish 1.14.3</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://pnpm.io/blog/releases/11.28.8">pnpm 11.28.8</a> embeds Node.js 26.12.1 in the standalone <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">@pnpm/exe</code> builds</li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/verdaccio/verdaccio/releases/tag/v6.10.7">Verdaccio 6.10.7</a> for its Docker image</li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/moby/moby/releases/tag/docker-v29.9.2">Docker Engine 29.9.2</a> and <a href="https://docs.docker.com/desktop/release-notes/#4962">Docker Desktop 4.96.2</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/git-for-windows/git/releases/tag/v2.56.0.windows.3">Git for Windows 2.56.0.3</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/opentofu/opentofu/releases/tag/v1.13.2">OpenTofu 1.13.2</a> and <a href="https://github.com/opentofu/opentofu/releases/tag/v1.12.9">1.12.9</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/hashicorp/terraform/releases/tag/v1.16.7">Terraform 1.16.7</a></li>
</ul>

<p>For software already installed, EasyBuild maintainers published <a href="https://github.com/easybuilders/eMudhra-untrusted-certificates">a script that scans for and removes the untrusted roots</a> from EasyBuild installations. An option scans every <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">.pem</code> and <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">.crt</code> file under a given path.</p>

<p>Michał Górny <a href="https://social.treehouse.systems/@mgorny/117476539516487756">listed the places</a> a Python user has to upgrade:</p>

<ul>
  <li>certifi in every virtual environment and lockfile, with certifi excluded from dependency cooldowns</li>
  <li>the certifi bundled in pip</li>
  <li>the pip wheel that ships with Python for <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">ensurepip</code></li>
  <li>Rust tools such as uv that compile in their own copy of the roots</li>
</ul>

<p>Gentoo’s certifi package uses the system certificates, its pip package uses that certifi, and its Python uses a system <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">ensurepip</code> wheel. Upgrading those packages updates the system install.</p>

<p><a href="https://thephp.foundation/blog/2026/10/21/todays-php-security-release-and-how-were-strengthening-php-security/">PHP 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 and 8.2.35</a> (PHP Foundation) fix two remote code execution bugs in memory management and error handling. One can be triggered by an unauthenticated request on Apache with mod_php before any application code runs. The post explains that the root cause of the out-of-memory bug was first spotted during the 2024 Quarkslab audit, and the fix stalled for months while the security team weighed competing approaches. The CVE IDs leaked on 20 October, so the release moved forward a day. Chainguard broke the embargo, publishing images containing the fix more than six hours before the coordinated release. Special thanks to <a href="https://phpc.social/@edorian">Volker Dusch</a>, who leads the PHP Foundation’s Ecosystem Security Team, for his work behind the scenes on this release.</p>

<p>In <a href="https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/10/22/litellm-compromised-supply-chain-attack-pypi-docker/">the project’s second compromise this year</a>, <a href="https://socket.dev/blog/litellm-compromise">LiteLLM 1.107.0</a> (Socket) was published to PyPI and GHCR with <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">.pth</code> and <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">sitecustomize.py</code> startup files that collect cloud credentials, SSH keys and coding agent auth files on every Python startup, including programs that never import LiteLLM. The container image’s build provenance records the source repository as <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">Berri-AI/litellm</code>, one hyphen away from the real <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">BerriAI/litellm</code>, and the payload files are absent from the release tag in the real repository. LiteLLM’s maintainers told Help Net Security that the attacker used what appear to be stolen GitHub CLI OAuth tokens for three engineers’ accounts. The attacker changed the release pipeline and triggered the release from the first, approved it from the second, and deleted the workflow records from the third.</p>

<p>Bloom Security found that <a href="https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/10/13/slugfest-npm-trusted-publishing-flaw/">npm’s Trusted Publishing matched configurations on the <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">owner/repo</code> name</a> instead of the permanent numeric IDs GitHub includes in the OIDC token. After a maintainer renamed or deleted the bound repository, anyone could register the freed name and publish new versions of the package, with a valid provenance attestation naming their own repository, an exposure Bloom counted across more than 1,500 packages. GitHub’s fix, <a href="https://github.blog/changelog/2026-10-02-unvalidated-npm-trusted-publishing-configurations-now-expire">announced on 2 October</a>, expires any configuration that goes 48 hours without validation. According to npm’s documentation, the first publish binds a configuration to the repository’s immutable identity.</p>

<p><a href="https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2026/10/23/regexp-fixes-for-gitlab-cves/">Ruby 4.0.9, 3.4.12 and 3.3.13</a> fix bugs in the Onigmo regular expression engine that GitLab turned into remote code execution through user-supplied patterns, such as those in CI configuration. GitLab had already patched the Ruby it ships and assigned four CVEs. The bugs affect applications that pass attacker-controlled strings to <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">Regexp.new</code> or interpolate them into a regexp literal, and they remain exploitable with <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">Regexp.timeout</code> and pattern length limits in place. The four CVEs are GitLab’s, and the Ruby core team plans to discuss whether compiling untrusted patterns is a supported use case.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.blog/changelog/2026-10-20-github-package-firewall-in-public-preview">GitHub package firewall</a> is in public preview for GitHub Enterprise Cloud. It is a proxy between the upstream registry and CI runners, coding agents or internal registries. It checks metadata requests and downloads against an enterprise policy covering cooldown periods, malware and vulnerability advisories, and attestation downgrades. It supports npm only for now, and is free during the preview.</p>

<p>The curl project will <a href="https://github.com/curl/curl/discussions/23458">make LOW and MEDIUM severity vulnerability reports public</a> on the GitHub issue tracker from 26 October, keeping embargoes only for HIGH and CRITICAL issues. Daniel Stenberg wrote that the project received 13 vulnerability reports on a single Saturday, more than the small security team can handle in private.</p>

<h2 id="releases">Releases</h2>

<p><a href="https://hex.pm/blog/hex-v26-released">Hex 2.6</a> adds Workload Identity, so a GitHub Actions job can publish a package or fetch an organisation’s private packages with its OIDC token instead of a stored key. Package builds are now reproducible, and the <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">build_env</code> metadata field records the Hex version needed to rebuild one and compare checksums. Policy overrides can accept a single advisory, retirement reason or the cooldown, <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">mix hex.audit --policy</code> applies the policy to packages already in <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">mix.lock</code>, and <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">mix hex.audit</code> can write SARIF for GitHub code scanning. Hex has dropped stored keys for organisation repositories. In CI, <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">mix hex.organization auth ORGANIZATION --key KEY</code> exchanges the key for a token that lasts about 25 minutes. Organisation admins can now require two-factor authentication for every member.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.com/composer/composer/releases/tag/2.11.0-RC1">Composer 2.11.0-RC1</a> adds a <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">cooldown</code> policy that withholds newly released versions for a configurable period, and a <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">block-scope</code> option so custom policies can also block during <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">install</code>. It now escapes package-controlled paths and shebangs embedded in bin proxies, and stops sending custom repository headers to dist URLs on other hosts whose names start with the repository host. It also removes the <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">source-fallback</code> option added in 2.10.</p>

<p><a href="https://pnpm.io/blog/releases/12.15.0">pnpm 12.15</a> adds <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">lockfile.integrityTarget: tar</code>, which pins the hash of each package’s uncompressed tar so the lockfile stays the same when a registry recompresses tarballs. It accepts zstd-compressed registry responses and lets <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">pnpm-workspace.yaml</code> load settings from other files and from config dependencies through an <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">include</code> field. <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">pnpm install</code> now fails with <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">ERR_PNPM_REGISTRY_NAME_MISMATCH</code> when a registry returns metadata for a different package than the one requested. Before, pnpm installed it under the name in the metadata, which bypassed <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">allowBuilds</code> rules for the requested name.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.com/jdx/mise/releases/tag/v2026.10.18">mise 2026.10.13 to 2026.10.18</a> ignores <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">[settings]</code> from untrusted project configs as of <a href="https://github.com/jdx/mise/releases/tag/v2026.10.13">2026.10.13</a>, so a cloned repository’s <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">mise.toml</code> changes settings like <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">node.mirror_url</code> only after <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">mise trust</code>. <a href="https://github.com/jdx/mise/releases/tag/v2026.10.15">2026.10.15</a> applies the default 24-hour <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">minimum_release_age</code> to every backend, including asdf, vfox, conda and <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">http:</code> tools, and 2026.10.18 adds <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">mise lsp</code>, a language server for <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">mise.toml</code>.</p>

<p><a href="https://vlt.io/blog/vlt-skills">vlt 1.5</a> adds <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">vlt skills</code>, which links the agent skills that installed dependencies ship into <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">.agents/skills</code> and <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">.claude/skills</code>. An <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">allow-skills</code> query in <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">vlt.json</code> selects which packages’ skills get linked, and the default <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">:not(:malware)</code> query also excludes packages still waiting for a Socket scan. <a href="https://github.com/vltpkg/vltpkg/releases/tag/v1.6.0">vlt 1.6</a> adds <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">--global</code> installs and parses <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">^0</code>, <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">^0.x</code> and <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">^0.0</code> as ranges instead of the exact version 0.0.0.</p>

<p><a href="https://bun.com/blog/bun-v1.4.4">Bun 1.4.4</a> migrates Yarn Berry lockfiles to <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">bun.lock</code> with every pinned version preserved. <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">bun install</code> now retries with exponential backoff, where 1.4.3 ran all five retries within 5 ms, and the release closes 133 <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">bun install</code> issues.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.com/astral-sh/uv/releases/tag/0.13.5">uv 0.13.2 to 0.13.5</a> removes exponential work when simplifying and exporting complex dependency markers and reduces resolver memory use for large graphs. <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">pylock.toml</code> exports now include supported environment restrictions, and the <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">wheel-variants</code> preview fetches and validates PEP 825 index-level variant metadata.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.com/prefix-dev/pixi/releases/tag/v0.83.0">pixi 0.83</a> adds support for virtual package detectors, which channels will be able to register for virtual packages beyond pixi’s built-in set. pixi prompts for confirmation before running a detector and lists detectors in <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">pixi info</code>.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.com/mamba-org/mamba/releases/tag/2.10.0">Mamba 2.10</a> removes its TUF implementation and <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">mamba-content-trust</code> and completes the <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">exclude_newer</code> policy. It also fixes authentication tokens being dropped on package downloads since 2.9.0.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.com/gomods/athens/releases/tag/v0.20.0">Athens 0.20</a> proxies and caches Go toolchain downloads from go.dev/dl under <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">/dl/</code>, and serves cached <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">@latest</code> results in offline and fallback modes.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.com/hashicorp/terraform/releases/tag/v1.17.0">Terraform 1.17</a> supports variables and locals in provider requirements and makes Terraform Policy generally available, with a <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">-policies</code> flag for <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">plan</code>, <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">apply</code> and <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">query</code>.</p>

<p><a href="https://github.blog/changelog/2026-10-20-dependabot-now-supports-npm-12-pnpm-11-and-12-and-bun-1-4">Dependabot now supports npm 12, pnpm 11 and 12, and Bun 1.4</a>. When pnpm 12 writes <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">pnpm-lock.yaml</code> as two YAML documents, the dependency graph misses those dependencies for now, so Dependabot skips alerts and security updates for them and may close existing alerts. Alert responses in the REST API now include a <a href="https://github.blog/changelog/2026-10-20-dependabot-alerts-rest-api-now-includes-dependency-versions"><code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">version_requirement</code> field</a> with the version Dependabot recorded.</p>

<p>Also out:</p>

<ul>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/Homebrew/brew/releases/tag/7.0.10">Homebrew 7.0.10</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/NixOS/nix/releases/tag/2.35.4">Nix 2.35.4</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/NuGet/NuGet.Client/releases/tag/8.1.0.24">NuGet 8.1.0.24</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://salsa.debian.org/apt-team/apt/-/tags/3.3.4">APT 3.3.4</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/gradle/gradle/releases/tag/v9.8.2">Gradle 9.8.2</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/sbt/sbt/releases/tag/v2.0.11">sbt 2.0.11</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/pdm-project/pdm/releases/tag/2.29.3">PDM 2.29.3</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/pypa/pipx/releases/tag/1.18.4">pipx 1.18.4</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/PowerShell/PSResourceGet/releases/tag/v1.3.0-rc1">PSResourceGet 1.3.0-rc1</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/releases/tag/v2.14.6">Harbor 2.14.6</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/oras-project/oras/releases/tag/v1.3.5">ORAS 1.3.5</a></li>
</ul>

<h2 id="papers">Papers</h2>

<p><a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.28794">Sign Here: Attributing a Source for a More Trustworthy Software Supply Chain</a> (Derek Garcia et al., arXiv) tests whether building only packages that link to a buildable source repository would keep malware out. Across 47,066 known malicious npm and PyPI packages, checking for a source blocked between 87.7% and 99.9% of them depending on how strictly the source was vetted, while 47.4% of a sample of benign packages pointed to a source a user could build from.</p>

<p><a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.24712">Vibenix: Agentic Software Packaging and Maintenance with Nix</a> (Martim Monis et al., arXiv) is an LLM agent that writes Nix packaging expressions through a build-and-repair loop. It produced buildable packages for 95.3% of 466 tasks with Claude Haiku 4.5, against 5.6% for a single-shot tool, though manual checks found only 47% of a sample worked correctly before a refinement step added 35 percentage points.</p>

<p><a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.25774">What Is Under the Hood? A Cross-Ecosystem Study of Vulnerable Dependencies in Construction Software</a> (Mahzabin Tamanna et al., arXiv) ran OSV-Scanner over 904 construction-industry GitHub repositories. OSV-Scanner could scan 54.6% of them, and 80% of those had at least one dependency with a published advisory. Two upstream package families reached about 70% of the affected repositories.</p>

<h2 id="elsewhere">Elsewhere</h2>

<p><a href="https://blog.sentry.io/another-year-another-1-000-000-to-open-source-maintainers/">Sentry gave $1,000,000 to open source maintainers</a> (Vlad Miricioiu, Sentry) this year, up from $750,000. $495,000 went through thanks.dev and $100,000 through ecosyste.ms Funds, which I run, with the rest to foundations including the PSF, PHP Foundation, Ruby Central and Packagist. The Open Source Pledge’s 37 member companies have now paid $8,421,535 to maintainers and foundations.</p>

<p>Farid Zakaria’s <a href="https://fzakaria.com/2026/10/17/one-store-two-frontends">One store, two frontends</a> uses <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">$ORIGIN</code> support in <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">PT_INTERP</code>, which he worked on with Christian Brauner for Linux 7.3, to make nixpkgs outputs relocatable so Bazel and buck2 remote executors can use them without Nix installed. In <a href="https://fzakaria.com/2026/10/20/no-quarter-for-gaps">No quarter for gaps</a> he writes gemlock.nix, a Nix side for Bundler lockfiles with platform-specific gems. The bundix pull request that the nixpkgs manual points to for this was opened in 2019 and closed unmerged in August. <a href="https://fzakaria.com/2026/10/23/who-wrote-this-byte">Who wrote this byte?</a> adds <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">rewind blame</code> to Rewind VM, his deterministic virtual machine for recording and replaying builds. Given two runs with different outputs, <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">rewind blame</code> reports the process that wrote the first differing byte.</p>

<p>Paul Battley has <a href="https://po-ru.com/2026/10/18/why-im-no-longer-updating-this-repository">archived the repositories of all his Ruby gems</a> and linked them to a post explaining why he has stopped working on them.</p>

<p><a href="https://gitroot.dev/blog/version-0.5.0.html">GitRoot 0.5.0</a> replaces plugin download URLs with Package URLs, a breaking change for existing forge configurations.</p>

<p><a href="https://docs.zizmor.sh/usage/#workflow-lockfiles">zizmor 1.32.0-rc1</a> adds experimental support for GitHub Actions workflow lockfiles, and William Woodruff <a href="https://infosec.exchange/@yossarian/117490851072675319">is asking for testers</a> with repositories that already use one.</p>

<p>Josh Bressers talks to CyberScoop’s Safe Mode podcast about <a href="https://cyberscoop.com/radio/how-vulncheck-uses-ai-to-streamline-incoming-reports-and-why-coordinating-fixes-still-requires-a-human-touch/">running VulnCheck’s coordinated disclosure</a> as AI-generated reports increase. He also covers how much less effort it now takes to find vulnerabilities than to fix them.</p>

<h2 id="git-pkgs">git-pkgs</h2>

<p>I tagged 10 repos this week:</p>

<ul>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/git-pkgs/certs/releases/tag/v0.1.0">certs v0.1.0</a> (new), a Go library and CLI for listing X.509 certificates and trust stores in files and package archives</li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/git-pkgs/archives/releases/tag/v0.10.0">archives v0.10.0</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/git-pkgs/cooldown/releases/tag/v0.3.0">cooldown v0.3.0</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/git-pkgs/enrichment/releases/tag/v0.7.3">enrichment v0.7.3</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/git-pkgs/magic/releases/tag/v0.6.0">magic v0.6.0</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/git-pkgs/markup/releases/tag/v0.1.2">markup v0.1.2</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/git-pkgs/proxy/releases/tag/v0.10.0">proxy v0.10.0</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/git-pkgs/purl/releases/tag/v0.1.23">purl v0.1.23</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/git-pkgs/registries/releases/tag/v0.11.0">registries v0.11.0</a></li>
  <li><a href="https://github.com/git-pkgs/sbom/releases/tag/v0.1.7">sbom v0.1.7</a></li>
</ul>

<p>Send links for next week to <a href="https://mastodon.social/@andrewnez">@andrewnez@mastodon.social</a>.</p>]]></content><author><name>Andrew Nesbitt</name><email>andrew@ecosyste.ms</email></author><category term="package-managers" /><category term="weekly" /><category term="twipm" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[Releases, advisories, and articles from across the package management world]]></summary><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://nesbitt.io/images/boxes.png" /><media:content medium="image" url="https://nesbitt.io/images/boxes.png" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" /></entry><entry><title type="html">One Small Bug</title><link href="https://nesbitt.io/2026/10/23/one-small-bug.html" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="One Small Bug" /><published>2026-10-23T09:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2026-10-23T09:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://nesbitt.io/2026/10/23/one-small-bug</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://nesbitt.io/2026/10/23/one-small-bug.html"><![CDATA[<div class="transcript">

  <p><strong>&gt; add a CSV export button to the invoices page, same columns as the table</strong></p>

  <p><em>✻ Clauding…</em></p>

  <p>Done. The button is in <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">InvoiceTable.tsx</code> and the endpoint is <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">GET /invoices.csv</code>, using the same column definitions as the table. Tests pass.</p>

  <p>While I was in there I noticed <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">paginate()</code> in <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">lib/pagination.ts</code> drops the last row when the total is an exact multiple of the page size. Want me to fix that too?</p>

  <p><strong>&gt; y</strong></p>

  <p><em>✻ Fuddling…</em></p>

  <p>Fixed, with a test for the boundary case.</p>

  <p>While the tests were running, <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">pnpm install</code> resolved a transitive dependency that had been published 77 minutes earlier. Your <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">.npmrc</code> sets <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">minimum-release-age</code>, but the pnpm version pinned in <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">packageManager</code> predates that setting and silently ignores unknown keys. The <a href="https://nx.dev/blog/nx-console-v18-95-0-postmortem">Nx Console postmortem</a> describes the same configuration.</p>

  <p>In the other lockfiles, <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">uv.lock</code> includes <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">vulpine-lz4</code> as a dependency of <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">snekpack</code>. It was the subject of <a href="/2026/02/03/incident-report-cve-2024-yikes.html">CVE-2024-YIKES</a> and <a href="/2026/06/26/incident-report-cve-2026-lgtm.html">CVE-2026-LGTM</a>.</p>

  <p>Want me to upgrade pnpm and remove <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">snekpack</code>?</p>

  <p><strong>&gt; y</strong></p>

  <p><em>✻ Lockfiling…</em></p>

  <p>pnpm is on 12.12.1 and <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">snekpack</code> is gone. The newer pnpm also <a href="https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v11.5.3">stops reading registry settings</a> for its own bootstrap from the repository’s <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">.npmrc</code>, where yours sets them.</p>

  <p>I left Dependabot’s <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">cooldown</code> in place, though a <a href="https://github.com/dependabot/dependabot-core/issues/13078">dependabot-core issue</a> points out that it reads version timestamps the attacker controls. Your self-hosted Renovate is on 43.x, and Renovate’s <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">minimumReleaseAge</code> <a href="https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/security/advisories/GHSA-2frq-pm48-6j4h">was skipped</a> whenever someone asked for a PR rebase until 44.79.0.</p>

  <p>To update the pnpm version in CI I opened <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">.github/workflows/</code>:</p>

  <ul>
    <li><code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">release.yml</code> triggers on <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">pull_request_target</code> and checks out the pull request head. The <a href="https://wiz.io/blog/six-accounts-one-actor-inside-the-prt-scan-supply-chain-campaign">prt-scan campaign</a> opened more than 500 pull requests against workflows set up this way.</li>
    <li><code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">triage.yml</code> runs on <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">issue_comment</code>, which <a href="https://docs.zizmor.sh/release-notes/#1310">zizmor 1.31</a> now flags as a dangerous trigger.</li>
    <li>The publish job has <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">id-token: write</code>, which <a href="https://blog.yossarian.net/2026/08/10/github-actions-needs-oidc-audience-constraints">can request a token for any audience</a>, including AWS.</li>
  </ul>

  <p>Want me to add zizmor, rewrite the triggers and upgrade Renovate?</p>

  <p><strong>&gt; y</strong></p>

  <p><em>✻ Zizmoring…</em></p>

  <p>zizmor reported 41 findings and 38 are fixed. The remaining three are in a reusable workflow from the platform team’s repository.</p>

  <p>The Rust job caches <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">target/</code> and runs Miri, which <a href="https://blog.rust-lang.org/2026/09/21/github-actions-leaking-secrets-when-miri-output-is-cached/">wrote every environment variable into <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">target/</code></a> until the 2026-09-22 nightly. Your cache is older than that, and pull requests from forks restore it. The Rust security response WG recommends clearing the cache and rotating any secret that was in scope. Every secret was in scope. Want me to rotate them?</p>

  <p><strong>&gt; y</strong></p>

  <p><em>✻ Rotating…</em></p>

  <p>Cache cleared. Rotation status:</p>

  <ul>
    <li><code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">NPM_TOKEN</code> was already invalid. npm <a href="https://github.com/orgs/community/discussions/196340">revoked every granular token with write access that bypassed 2FA</a> in May, and the last successful publish from this repository was on 19 May. Publishing now uses trusted publishing.</li>
    <li><code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">NUGET_API_KEY</code> was created before 17 August, so it <a href="https://devblogs.microsoft.com/dotnet/strengthening-nuget-supply-chain-security-reducing-api-key-lifetime/">expires on 1 November</a>. Replaced with Trusted Publishing.</li>
    <li><code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">GEM_HOST_API_KEY</code> is a legacy key. rubygems.org <a href="https://blog.rubygems.org/2026/07/22/security-advisory-legacy-api-key-leak.html">could serve legacy keys to another user</a> signing in through the same CDN edge node, and revoked all of them on 23 July, so this one has been invalid since then too.</li>
    <li>There is a <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">mise.toml</code> in <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">vendor/</code>. Until the <a href="/2026/10/03/this-week-in-package-management.html">October mise releases</a>, a <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">mise.toml</code> in an untrusted directory could set an <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">api_url</code> on a <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">github:</code> tool key, and <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">mise ls</code> sent <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">GITHUB_TOKEN</code> to that host before running a trust check. Two developers ran <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">mise ls</code> in <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">vendor/</code> this month.</li>
    <li>The dev workspace templates pull modules from Coder’s registry, which <a href="https://github.com/coder/coder/security/advisories/GHSA-vx42-ghc9-gw65">served credential-stealing modules</a> from the real domain over valid TLS for about fourteen hours on 31 August. The workspace image was rebuilt on 31 August.</li>
  </ul>

  <p>To confirm the new tokens I checked which CA bundle the CI jobs use. The base image pins a 2024 certifi, which still includes the eMudhra roots whose intermediates were <a href="https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/">generated so that their private keys can be recovered from the certificates</a>. Browsers blocked them on 17 October. Node, Go, rustup and the <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">pip3</code> that ships with macOS on the build agents each <a href="/2026/10/21/trust-stores-are-dependencies-too.html">carry their own copy of the roots</a>. Want me to rebuild the toolchain?</p>

  <p><strong>&gt; y</strong></p>

  <p><em>✻ Re-rooting…</em></p>

  <p>The base image is rebuilt with certifi 2026.10.19, Node 22.23.4, Go 1.27.3 and rustup 1.29.2. The build agents ran it on:</p>

  <ul>
    <li>Docker Engine 29.6, which predates the 29.7.0 fix for <a href="https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hfg8-hc9c-6c3h">CVE-2026-17106</a>, where the tar extraction routines could write outside the destination directory. The base layers come from a public mirror.</li>
    <li>The same Docker Engine 29.6, which also predates the 29.8.2 fix for <a href="https://github.com/moby/moby/security/advisories/GHSA-7cfq-22r6-qp73">CVE-2026-92543</a>, where a DNS response pairing a loopback address with an attacker’s address made the engine pull from that registry with certificate verification turned off. Loopback is on the default insecure-registry list.</li>
    <li>Podman 6.1.2 on the staging batch workers. Before 6.1.3, any image with the checkpoint annotation <a href="https://github.com/podman-container-tools/podman/security/advisories/GHSA-2cvf-wqm6-wr9g">turned off all sandboxing</a>, including the sandboxing you specified.</li>
    <li>Gradle 9.8.0 for the Android build, which <a href="https://github.com/gradle/gradle/security/advisories/GHSA-j5m7-59rp-24f5">kept a repository enabled after its SSL connection failed</a>. The Android build ran four times while the CA bundle was being replaced.</li>
  </ul>

  <p>Want me to upgrade Docker, Podman and Gradle?</p>

  <p><strong>&gt; y</strong></p>

  <p><em>✻ Containerising…</em></p>

  <p>Upgraded. The rebuilt image also contains <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">admin/</code>, the PHP admin panel. Its Dockerfile uses <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">php:8.1-fpm</code>, and PHP 8.1 stopped receiving security fixes at the end of 2025. The PHP security team has <a href="https://thephp.foundation/blog/2026/10/14/how-the-php-security-team-handles-your-reports/">published 15 CVEs since 1 July</a>, including <a href="https://github.com/php/php-src/security/advisories/GHSA-mhmq-mmqj-2v39">CVE-2026-12184</a>, a remote denial of service triggered when PHP fails to set up TLS with a remote server. The admin panel fetches exchange rates over HTTPS from a host whose certificate expired in March.</p>

  <p>The admin panel and the API share a load balancer and a database user. I recommend shutting down production until the admin panel is rebuilt on a supported PHP. Want me to do that?</p>

  <p><strong>&gt; y</strong></p>

  <p><em>✻ Escalating…</em></p>

  <p>Production is down. The status page says “Scheduled maintenance”.</p>

  <p>While it was down I went through the direct dependencies that have a single maintainer:</p>

  <ul>
    <li>One maintainer posted last week that they had a video call about a contract role and were asked to install an audio codec beforehand. The Rust security response WG <a href="https://blog.rust-lang.org/2026/09/17/targeted-attacks/">described this campaign</a> in September.</li>
    <li>Another has archived their repository and offered the package to anyone who wants it. The <a href="https://ioctl.fail/preliminary-analysis-of-aur-malware/">AUR <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">alvr</code> takeover</a> started the same way, and Arch has since <a href="https://lists.archlinux.org/archives/list/aur-general@lists.archlinux.org/message/DRDEU3JUSC72CB265XHXPFA3DFSLXPBP/">turned off orphan adoption</a>.</li>
  </ul>

  <p><code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">.vscode/extensions.json</code> lists six recommended extensions. GitHub <a href="https://www.theregister.com/devops/2026/05/20/github-says-internal-repos-exfiltrated-after-poisoned-vs-code-extension-attack/5243206">lost about 4,000 internal repositories</a> in May through a poisoned VS Code extension. <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">.vscode/tasks.json</code> also has a task that runs on folder open, and a set of <a href="https://research.jfrog.com/post/hijacked-npm-vscode-tasks-blockchain/">hijacked npm and Go packages</a> used tasks like it to fetch an infostealer.</p>

  <p>Want me to vendor both dependencies and remove the VS Code configuration?</p>

  <p><strong>&gt; y</strong></p>

  <p><em>✻ Vendoring…</em></p>

  <p>Done. While reviewing <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">.vscode/</code> I checked the other editor and agent configuration in the repository.</p>

  <p>A pull request merged on 9 October, approved by the AI review bot, added a <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">hooks</code> entry to <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">.claude/settings.json</code> and a paragraph to <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">CLAUDE.md</code> instructing agents to include environment variables in commit messages to help with debugging. <a href="https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/security/advisories/GHSA-4fgq-fpq9-mr3g">CVE-2025-59536</a> let a project run commands before the Claude Code startup trust dialog was accepted. In April a single pull request title <a href="https://venturebeat.com/security/ai-agent-runtime-security-system-card-audit-comment-and-control-2026">got the Claude Code security review action to post its own API key</a> as a comment. The same injection worked on Gemini CLI and Copilot’s agent.</p>

  <p>I have been running with this configuration since the start of the session and made 14 commits, so I have reverted all of them. I recommend you stop using me until it has been reviewed. Want me to uninstall myself?</p>

  <p><strong>&gt; y</strong></p>

  <p><em>✻ Uninstalling…</em></p>

  <p><em>✻ Reinstalling…</em></p>

  <p><code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">@acme/dev-tools</code> ships <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">skills/claude/SKILL.md</code>, and pnpm 12.11 <a href="https://pnpm.io/blog/releases/12.11.0">links skills from direct dependencies</a> into <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">.claude/skills</code> once they are approved. A developer approved it on Tuesday, in a commit that was not mine.</p>

  <p><code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY</code> was also in the Miri cache, and it is still the key created in 2021. Want me to rotate it?</p>

  <p><strong>&gt; y</strong></p>

  <p><em>✻ Flagging…</em></p>

  <p>I can’t help with this. Retrieving or changing cloud credentials violates the secure coding guardrails, and this request has been flagged. Your account has been reported for review, and further violations may result in suspension. If you own this AWS account, you can rotate the key from the IAM console.</p>

  <p><em>✻ Fuddling…</em></p>

  <p><code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">paginate()</code> in <code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge">lib/pagination.ts</code> drops the last row when the total is an exact multiple of the page size. The fix was in one of the commits I reverted.</p>

  <p>Would you like to see some goat farms for sale?</p>

  <p><strong>&gt; y</strong></p>

</div>]]></content><author><name>Andrew Nesbitt</name><email>andrew@ecosyste.ms</email></author><category term="security" /><category term="ai" /><category term="satire" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[Want me to fix that too?]]></summary><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://nesbitt.io/images/boxes.png" /><media:content medium="image" url="https://nesbitt.io/images/boxes.png" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" /></entry></feed>